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Abstract 
 
The predictive validity of any assessment system is only as good as its 
implementation. Across a range of decision settings, algorithmic methods of data 
combination often match or outperform the judgmental accuracy of expert judges. 
Despite this, individual assessments still largely rely on the use of expert judgment to 
combine candidate assessment information into an overall assessment rating to predict 
desired criteria such as job performance. This typically results in lower levels of validity 
than what could theoretically have been achieved.  
Based on archival assessment data from an international management consulting 
firm, this dissertation presents three related studies with an overarching goal of better 
understanding the processes underlying why expert judgment tends to be less accurate in 
prediction compared to algorithmic judgmental methods. First, the Lens Model is used to 
break down expert judgment in individual assessments into its component processes, 
finding that when combining assessment information into an overall evaluation of 
candidates, expert assessors use suboptimal predictor weighting schemes and also use 
them inconsistently when evaluating multiple candidates. Second, the ability of expert 
assessors to tailor their judgments to maximise predictive power for specific 
organisations is tested by comparing models of expert judgment local and non-local to 
organisations. No evidence of valid expertise tailored to organisations is found as models 
of expert judgment local to a specific organisation performed only as well as models non-
local to that organisation. Third, the importance of judgmental consistency in maximising 
predictive validity is evaluated by testing random weighting schemes. Here, simply 
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exercising mindless consistency by applying a randomly generated weighting scheme 
consistently is enough to outperform expert judgment.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the suboptimal and inconsistent ways 
that expert assessors combine assessment information is drastically hampering their 
ability to make accurate evaluations of assessment candidates and to predict candidates’ 
future job performance. Even if they are able to demonstrate valid expert insight from 
time to time, over the long run the opportunities for human error far outweigh any 
opportunity for expertise to be truly influential. Implications of these findings for how 
assessments are conducted in organisations as well as recommendations for how expert 
judgment could still be retained and improved are discussed. 
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Overview 
 
When combining information to predict desired outcomes, the most common 
approach has been to rely on clinical or expert judgment (Jeanneret & Silzer, 1998; Ryan 
& Sackett, 1987; Silzer & Jeanneret, 2011). Yet, mechanical methods of data 
combination such as using algorithms and predefined predictor weighting schemes 
consistently match or outperform the judgmental accuracy of clinical data combinations 
(i.e., subjective expert judgment) across all settings that have been studied (Grove & 
Meehl, 1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Kuncel, Klieger, Connelly, & 
Ones, 2013). Despite mechanical methods of judgment outperforming clinical methods, 
people often still prefer to use and rely on expert judgment and intuition, and are resistant 
to using mechanical methods for reasons including overconfidence in human expertise, 
personal theories about how judgments should be made, and lack of knowledge about the 
efficacy of mechanical methods (Highhouse, 2008; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Grove & Meehl, 
1996). Additionally, the general public tends to perceive clinical judgment to be more 
effective, and describe mechanical methods with sterile adjectives (Diab, Pui, 
Yankelevich, & Highhouse, 2011; Eastwood, Snook, & Luther, 2012).  
In this dissertation, individual assessments are examined as a prominent example 
of reliance on expert judgment in combining predictor information. Across the globe, 
organisations make countless numbers of hiring decisions each year which, in turn, affect 
the lives of individuals and the success of organisations. Correctly predicting which 
individuals will perform to the highest level so that top performing individuals can be 
selected is crucial to maximising organisational productivity. Common methods for 
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evaluating candidates for the most complex professional and leadership positions include 
methods that strain the information processing limits of decision makers. Individual 
assessments comprise multiple assessments (e.g., simulations, role-playing, interviews, 
and intelligence and personality tests) that evaluate job candidates’ knowledge, skills, and 
abilities on multiple assessment dimensions such as communication, leadership, and 
organisation.  
Even though individual assessment information can be combined mechanically, 
common practice tends to rely on (and promote) the use of expert judgment (Silzer & 
Jeanneret, 2011). Although overall assessment ratings based on individual assessments 
are valid predictors of job performance (Morris, Daisley, Wheeler, & Boyer, 2015), many 
doubt that the information from individual assessments is being used optimally. While 
the importance of assessing job candidates and predicting job performance is easily 
agreed upon, what tends to elicit stronger opinions is with regards to how to best combine 
predictor information (e.g., Kuncel & Highhouse, 2011; Silzer & Jeanneret, 2011). In 
practice, the data combination stage of any assessment system can act to maximise 
predictive power or it can bottleneck the utility of the assessment system. If the reliance 
on expert judgment limits the predictive power of individual assessments, then improving 
individual assessments will require either replacing expert judgment with more 
mechanical methods, or improving expert judgment. Given the reluctance towards purely 
mechanical methods of judgment, the more realistic way forward will be to improve 
expert judgment, and not to outright replace expert judgment. 
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To lay the groundwork for improving expert judgment, the elements of expert 
judgment need to be broken down and key deficiencies need to be identified for 
improvement. In this dissertation, three studies grounded in the Lens Model (Brunswik, 
1952; 1955; 1956; Hammond, 1955) are conducted in service of this goal. These studies 
are described below, and are also summarised in Table 1. 
The first study is a complete Lens Model decomposition of individual 
assessments. It represents the first and most comprehensive examination of this question 
in the literature. The Lens Model is a classic framework for studying judgment and 
decision making processes that has been commonly used across many different fields. 
However, an examination of individual assessments using this framework has been 
absent from the literature. The Lens Model provides a representation of how each piece 
of predictor information (e.g., ratings on different assessment dimensions) is weighted by 
the judge(s) and combined into an overall prediction of some outcome (e.g., job 
performance). It additionally provides a representation of how each piece of predictor 
information is, in reality, related to some criterion of interest. This allows us to estimate 
how experts combine predictor information, and to determine how well their data 
combination policies match up with the actual relationships between the predictors and 
the criterion. The Lens Model features a number of parameters (Table 2) used to quantify 
various aspects of judgment, and these will be thoroughly discussed later. 
The second study examines the myth of expert insight as many judges still believe 
that it is possible for clinical methods of data combination to outperform mechanical 
methods (Highhouse, 2008; Jeanneret & Silzer, 1998; Silzer & Jeanneret, 2011). One 
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specific application of expert insight is to tailor judgments to the characteristics that make 
each organisation or candidate unique. Effective use of expert insight would mean that 
expert assessors are able to adjust their judgmental policies in valid ways to cater to the 
candidates they are evaluating or to the organisation for which they are evaluating 
candidates. For example, they may be able to perceive unique features of candidates and 
collect additional information to determine how these features would affect future 
performance, or understand how interactions between organisational and employee 
characteristics can determine job performance (e.g., Silzer & Jeannert, 2011). Using the 
part of the Lens Model that models the judges’ judgmental policies, a “model of man” 
(Goldberg, 1970) can be derived to estimate the weights used, on average, by the 
assessors to combine predictor information. Using the “model of man” approach, we can 
capture the judgmental policies of expert assessors at one organisation, and apply them to 
make judgments at another organisation. Expert judges would be expected to tailor their 
judgments for the specific organisation for which they conduct assessments, and this 
tailoring is often a selling point for assessment firms. Therefore, if expert insight is truly 
effective, we would expect to see that predictions made using a “model of man” at the 
same organisation to outperform predictions made using the same model but at a different 
organisation. 
The third study answers the question of whether accurate predictor weighting or 
consistent predictor weighting is more important for maximizing predictive validity. One 
explanation for the superiority of mechanical methods of judgment over clinical methods 
is that mechanical methods can consistently apply a single set of predictor weights across 
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every single judgmental case. Lens Model research has shown that human judges are 
often inconsistent in their application of a single predictor weighting policy over multiple 
judgments (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). This third study provides a thorough examination 
of this issue by isolating consistent weighting from accurate weighting in making 
predictive judgments. Simulations are conducted to test the predictive validity of 
judgments made by combining individual assessment information using 1) randomly 
generated sets of predictor weights applied consistently across all judgmental cases, and 
2) random weights applied completely randomly across all judgmental cases. These are 
compared against non-random judgments (expert judgment, unit weighting via simple 
sums, and optimal weights) to determine how effective random but consistent weights are 
at prediction, and how well expert judgment fares against random weighting methods. 
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Literature Review 
 
Defining Mechanical and Clinical Data Combination 
 
Mechanical Data Combination 
Mechanical methods of data combination are those that rely on an objective, 
algorithmic method to combine information, such as equations or actuarial tables (Meehl, 
1954; Sawyer, 1966; Thorndike, 1918). Here, the data combination policy is explicitly 
known, and the same policy is used consistently across all judgmental cases without 
human interference. Examples include methods of high complexity such as deriving 
Pareto-optimal weights to combine predictor scores in a way that achieves optimal trade-
offs between desired but competing criteria (De Corte, Lievens, & Sackett, 2007), or 
methods of low complexity such as simply summing up all predictor scores (i.e., unit 
weights via simple sums). 
Other terms for “mechanical” seen in the literature include: objective, actuarial, 
statistical, and algorithmic. These terms will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, lay perceptions of mechanical methods commonly include a 
sterile and impersonal factor (e.g., rigid, inflexible, and cold; Diab, Pui, Yankelevich, & 
Highhouse, 2011), playing a role in the preference for judgment and decision making 
methods that have a more salient human component (Diab et al., 2011; Eastwood, Snook, 
& Luther, 2012). 
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Clinical Data Combination 
Clinical methods of data combination are those that rely on subjective human 
intuition and judgment to combine information (Meehl, 1954; Sawyer, 1966; Thorndike, 
1918). Here, the method of data combination is not necessarily known, as even expert 
judges are not always able to perfectly comprehend their own judgmental policies (Hastie 
& Dawes, 2001). This means that not only could data combination policies differ 
between judges (i.e., interrater unreliability), they could also differ between judgments 
within the same judge (i.e., intrarater unreliability). Simply put, the defining 
characteristic of a clinical data combination boils down to whether a clinician (or another 
type of human judge) is involved (Sawyer, 1966). 
Although the term “clinical” refers to the clinical psychologists described by 
Meehl (1954), it is not limited to clinical psychologists. It includes anyone who engages 
in the use of subjective human judgment. Additionally, there is no expectation that 
clinical psychologists must exclusively use clinical methods of data combination; clinical 
information can be combined mechanically. Other terms for “clinical” seen in the 
literature include: subjective, holistic, intuitive, expert, and human. Again, these terms 
will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. The term “expert judgment” will be 
reserved for any discussion specific to clinical judgments made by a judge who can claim 
some level of expertise1 in his or her field. 
 
                                                 
1 Claims of expertise are often as subjective as having been judged by peers as being an expert (see the 
section, “The Case for Expert Judgment”). 
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Not Just a Dichotomy 
 Although mechanical and clinical data combinations have often been pitted 
against one another, doing one does not necessarily exclude doing the other. Sawyer 
(1966) described mechanical synthesis, where the judge makes an overall judgment 
(clinically) from a given set of predictor information, after which the clinical judgment is 
mechanically combined with the original data to obtain a final overall judgment. He also 
described clinical synthesis, which is basically the opposite. In clinical synthesis, a 
mechanical composite is first calculated, after which the judge makes the final prediction 
by holistically combining the mechanical composite with the original data.  
Very few studies have formally tested the effectiveness of these methods but 
some tentative patterns have emerged. With mechanical synthesis, including the judge’s 
clinical prediction as one variable in the final mechanical prediction still preserves 
predictive accuracy relative to a purely mechanical composite that excludes the clinical 
prediction. On the other hand, the clinical synthesis results in poorer accuracy compared 
to a purely mechanical composite, but has better accuracy compared to a purely clinical 
composite. In both cases, combining clinical and mechanical data combination methods 
yields predictive validity better than clinical judgment alone, but does not outperform the 
purely mechanical composite. 
 Another approach that combines both types of judgmental methods is the 
bootstrapped “model of man” approach (Goldberg, 1970; Hoffman, 1960). The judge’s 
data combination policy is modelled using regression of clinical judgment on the original 
predictors, after which the modelled predictor weights can then be applied back to the 
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original predictors to obtain a “model of man” composite judgment. This essentially 
allows the judge’s data combination policy to be statistically estimated and then 
mechanically applied. Across a range of judgment and decision making scenarios, this is 
a method that has been found to outperform the judges themselves (i.e., their purely 
clinical judgment) in predicting the same criteria (Dawes, 1979; Dawes & Corrigan, 
1974; Goldberg, 1970). This approach will be explored in this dissertation. 
 
A Note on Data Combination 
It should be noted that data combination is distinct from data collection. It is 
possible for data to be collected clinically (e.g., unstructured interview), and combined 
mechanically with other information using a statistical formula (Sawyer, 1966)2. The 
opposite can be true as well, where data is collected mechanically (e.g., test scores, 
personnel records), and combined clinically with other information by a human judge. 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the data combination stage of 
individual assessments. Regardless of how the component assessment information is 
collected, the principal goal is to compare clinical and mechanical methods of combining 
the same set of information into an overall judgment. 
 
  
                                                 
2 Sawyer (1966) provides a thorough discussion of the interplay between data collection and data 
combination. 
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Individual Assessments 
 
Definitions 
Individual assessments (also referred to as “individual psychological 
assessments”) are a common practice used by organisations to evaluate candidates for 
selection or developmental purposes, and have been considered a core competency for 
education and training in industrial/organizational psychology (Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology, 2016). A smattering of ways individual assessments have 
been described include: 
- “… one psychologist making an assessment decision for a personnel-related 
purpose about one individual” (Ryan & Sackett, 1987, p. 456) 
- “… a process of measuring a person’s knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
personal style to evaluate characteristics and behavior that are relevant to 
(predictive of) successful job performance” (Jeanneret & Silzer, 1998, p. 3) 
- “… a loosely defined set of procedures, similar to practices developed and 
performed in clinical and counseling settings, used to make recommendations 
for higher level hires” (Highhouse, 2002, p. 363) 
- “… assessment conducted by a highly trained individual who collects, 
integrates, and interprets data from a range of sources, including an interview, 
personality and/or cognitive testing, and business simulations. Essentially, 
they are individual assessment centers…” (Hazucha et al., 2011, p. 298) 
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- “…through the use of various tools, professionals use the individual 
psychological assessment to evaluate the applicant as a whole and make a 
prediction about the applicant’s appropriateness for a position within an 
organization holistically” (Morris, Daisley, Wheeler, & Boyer, 2015, p. 5) 
- “A defining feature of the individual assessment is the expert assessor who 
administers, interprets, and integrates the results of the battery (Morris et al., 
2015, p. 15) 
Clearly, these descriptions are quite broad. In a survey sampled from members of 
the Division of Industrial and Organizational Psychology of the American Psychological 
Association (what is now the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology 
(SIOP)), Ryan and Sackett (1987)3 noted that across respondents, there was considerable 
variability in the specific assessments implemented and the assessment content 
dimensions for which candidates were evaluated, as well as variability in the attitudes 
toward the validity of these assessments. Because there is no single, specific way to 
implement individual assessments, it is better thought of as a class of processes or 
procedures for evaluating candidates for organisational selection or development 
purposes.  
The bottom line is that candidates complete some battery of assessments (e.g., 
cognitive ability tests, personality tests, interviews, biodata, work sample tests, 
simulations), and based on their performance on these assessments, they are evaluated on 
                                                 
3 Given that this study (Ryan & Sackett, 1987) is now over 30 years old, its findings may not necessarily be 
representative of the current state of affairs in individual assessments. An updated version of this study 
would be very informative and would likely garner a sizable citation count. 
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several job-relevant dimensions (e.g., leadership, communication, judgment). Finally, the 
assessor combines these dimension ratings into an overall assessment rating for each 
candidate to predict how well the candidate would fit the job and would perform on the 
job. Ideally, the assessor’s judgments would be informed by a thorough job analysis of 
what determines effective performance for the job in question, but in reality it “…is 
typically as informal as a discussion with the client organization about what the job must 
accomplish and what competencies are required” (Thornton, Hollenbeck, & Johnson, 
2010, p. 828). 
Test batteries and assessment centres are two assessment methods that are similar 
to, but distinct from individual assessments (Silzer & Jeanneret, 2011). Test batteries 
consist only of psychological tests and inventories and are often administered to large 
numbers of candidates. Assessment centres are similar to individual assessments in that a 
variety of assessments are administered, candidates are evaluated on a number of job-
related dimensions, and assessors as a group combine information and make an overall 
assessment rating. The differences are characterised by “…implementation logistics, 
costs, and staff requirements… [and] method differences such as the required and 
dominant use of simulations and multiple assessors (not necessarily psychologists) in 
assessment centers, whereas individual assessments often include a different, and often 
broader, mix of assessment tools” (Silzer & Jeanneret, 2011, p. 272). Given the overlap 
between these methods, research from test batteries and assessment centres have the 
potential to inform individual assessments and vice versa. 
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Validity 
 Overall assessment ratings from individual assessments moderately predict 
subjective supervisory ratings of job performance (mean corrected r = .30), and 
administrative decisions such as promotions, salary changes, and bonuses (mean 
uncorrected r = .17) (Morris et al., 2015). Although information about the validity of 
individual assessments at the dimension level is absent from the literature, insight into 
this can be drawn from research on assessment centres. Arthur, Day, McNelly, and Edens 
(2003) found that when predicting job performance, the validity of assessment centre 
dimensions fell in the range of ρ = .25 to .39, which was comparable to the predictive 
validity of the overall assessment rating (ρ = .36).  
Given the reliance on expert judgment in combining assessment information into 
the overall assessment rating, it raises the question of whether they would have higher 
predictive validity if the assessment dimensions are instead combined into an overall 
rating using purely mechanical methods. In their meta-analysis, Arthur et al. (2003) 
found that using an optimally weighted mechanical composite of the assessment 
dimensions resulted in a multiple correlation of .45 with job performance, outperforming 
the expert-judged overall assessment rating which is typically based on a group 
integration meeting. It appears that although individual assessments are able to yield 
valid predictions of desired job performance criteria, the common practice of using the 
subjective judgment and intuition of expert assessors to combine assessment dimension 
information into an overall rating results in lower levels of predictive validity compared 
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to what could have theoretically been achieved with an optimally weighted mechanical 
data combination. 
 
Where Did the Validity Go? 
 The definitions of individual assessments presented previously provide a couple 
of insights into the shortcomings of individual assessments and into why they 
demonstrate suboptimal levels of predictive validity, namely issues related to the use of 
human judgment. Ultimately, the levels of predictive validity that could ideally be 
obtained from the component assessments is let down by human error in combining 
assessment information into an overall evaluation of assessment candidates. 
 One problem has to do with who actually conducts these assessments. Ryan and 
Sackett (1987) defined individual assessments as being conducted by a psychologist. In 
practice however, this is not necessarily the case. Highhouse (2002) described the 
problem in very delicate terms: 
“Practitioners with no training in personnel selection and EEO issues continue to 
flood into this area without anyone challenging them to provide professionally 
acceptable evidence for the veracity of their claims. Similar to psychotherapy, it 
seems that the principle of functional autonomy4 has enabled individual 
psychological assessment to survive and flourish” (p. 391). 
                                                 
4 The term functional autonomy is in reference to Astin (1961), who described the increasing prevalence of 
psychotherapy in clinical practice without the supporting empirical evidence to back up its use. 
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Thornton, Hollenbeck, and Johnson (2010) informally sampled psychologists at 
consulting firms in 2007 and collected estimates of annual psychologist-conducted 
individual assessments in the United States in a range from 15,000 and 50,0005. Although 
a many of these assessments are conducted by trained psychologists, there is a lack of 
professional regulation in this field (Kwaske, 2004) and many assessments are conducted 
by non-psychologists such as managers, supervisors, trainers, and human resource 
professionals (Klimoski & Zukin, 2003). Drawing from assessment center research, those 
that used psychologists demonstrated higher predictive validity than those that used 
managers to evaluate candidates (Spychalski, Quiñones, Gaugler, & Pohley, 1997). 
Additionally, it is not simply an issue of whether trained psychologists or non-
psychologists are used as assessors. The type of training potentially matters as well. 
Whereas assessors trained in clinical or counseling psychology would be expected to be 
more skilled in interviewing and observation, assessors trained in 
industrial/organizational psychology would be expected to be better versed in job 
analysis, selection-related measurement, and legal/ethical issues in selection and 
assessment (Kwaske, 2004). Jeanneret and Silzer (1998) described an unpublished study 
at an unnamed assessment provider, where counseling psychologists were more thorough 
in describing their candidates, but industrial/organizational psychologists were better at 
predicting their candidates’ future job performance. 
Regardless of whether an expert or non-expert conducts these individual 
assessments, the fact still remains that a human judge is making the overall judgments 
                                                 
5 Fairly imprecise estimates, which reflects the imprecision of expert judgment. 
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and predictions about candidates in individual assessments. This is evident in the 
definitions put forth by Morris et al. (2015), in which assessment candidates are 
evaluated holistically. When holistic judgment is used to combine assessment 
information, human error in judgment will detriment the predictive validity of individual 
assessments to the extent that valid use of expertise does not make up for it. The 
shortcomings of expert judgment using holistic methods of data combination are the 
focus of this dissertation, and are the subject of review in the following sections.  
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The Case for Expert Judgment 
 
What Experts Do 
Experts’ judgmental processes have long been studied under the Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) framework (Klein, 2008; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & 
Zsambok, 1993). This approach attempts to decipher expert intuition and explain how 
expert judges make predictive judgments, often in high pressure and ill-defined 
situations. Here, expertise is defined by peer judgment6 and nomination for someone who 
has demonstrated exceptional skill in a particular domain, often possessing some 
combination of experience and credentials. The use of this definition means that 
“[c]ompetence is inherent in the definition of expertise, so questions like “Why do 
experts predict badly?” do not make sense” (Philips, Klein, & Sleck, 2004, p. 299). In 
essence, it answers the question of what people labelled as experts do differently from 
those not labelled as experts, but it does not address the question of how well experts 
make predictive judgments as their competence is assumed. 
 Through the use of observation and task analysis to study expert decision making, 
the NDM approach resulted in the development of the recognition-primed decision model 
to describe the process experts use to make their judgments and decisions (Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). In this model, experts 1) recognise a familiar 
problem within their domain of expertise, 2) search their long term memory for the first 
solution that intuitively comes to mind, and 3) mentally simulate the action to determine 
                                                 
6 It is unclear what qualifies peers to be competent judges of one’s level of expertise. 
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its potential efficacy. If the solution is judged to be one that works, it will be 
implemented, otherwise either it will be modified or another solution is generated and 
mentally tested. The goal here is not necessarily to obtain the optimal solution, but rather 
to obtain a satisfactory solution (Philips et al., 2004). 
 What has come out of the NDM approach to understanding expertise is the 
finding that experts have the requisite domain-specific knowledge to recognise familiar 
problems as well as the possible solutions to those problems. Therefore, expert intuition 
is not some mystical unknown, but rather: “The situation has provided cue: This cue has 
given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the information provides 
the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition” (Simon, 1992, p. 
155). To develop this expertise – or ‘skilled intuition’ – two conditions are required: 1) 
cues relevant to the problem domain must be specifiable and stable over time (i.e., the 
problem needs to be recognisable), and 2) there needs to be adequate opportunity to learn 
the cues and the responses and strategies for tackling the problem (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009).  
 In the context of individual assessments, the implication of the recognition-
primed decision model is that expert assessors should theoretically be able to recognise 
situations in which their expert insight can be applied to improve their evaluation of a 
candidate, and situations in which their judgmental policies need to be altered to suit 
these situations. For example, the assessor may have had prior experience with candidates 
who come from unconventional experiential backgrounds, and in this case evaluate a 
candidate with job but not educational experience differently than a candidate with 
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educational but not job experience. Effectively navigating through such complexities has 
often been touted as the hallmark of expert judgment. 
 
Expertise in Individual Assessments 
 There is a heavy reliance on expert judgment in individual assessments, and Silzer 
and Jeanneret (2011) produced what is, to date, probably the most extensive description 
of all the skills and abilities that expert assessors supposedly bring to the table when 
conducting individual assessments. They make a number of bold claims about the use of 
expert judgment, including that expert assessors: 
- “are accurate observers of behavior … can see and hear behavior in their 
observations of an individual that can provide useful and sometimes critical 
pieces of information to rating the individual on key dimensions” (p. 276) 
- “can also formulate and test hypotheses about the individual. Using an 
analytical approach, they can probe and collect additional information relevant 
to a concern or a dimension” (p. 276) 
- “can understand specific behavioral data points while also seeing larger 
behavioral patterns and psychological constructs” (p. 276) 
- “can complete both normative and ipsative interpretations for the same 
variables for the same assessee that leads to a fuller understanding of that 
individual … a process that would be virtually impossible to complete in some 
mechanical or statistical manner” (p. 276) 
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- “can accurately sort behavior into key performance-related dimensions” (p. 
277) 
- “can integrate information and accurately rate an individual on specific 
performance dimensions” (p. 277) 
- “can consider a range of behavior and determine how relevant the behavior is 
to later performance effectiveness” (p. 277) 
In summary, Silzer and Jeanneret (2011) claim that expert assessors are able to 
effectively exercise their intuitive judgment to validly integrate information in complex 
ways. However, their assertions are not well supported by empirical evidence and 
“[r]esearch on decision making suggests that human judges simply cannot do the things 
suggested by Silzer and Jeanneret” (Kuncel & Highhouse, 2011, p. 302). This research is 
reviewed in the next section. 
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The Shortcomings of Expert Judgment 
 
Does Expertise Actually Make a Difference? 
 Experts should have domain-specific knowledge and the ability and skills to 
implement this knowledge to solve problems. As such, they would be expected to be 
better at making judgments in their domain of expertise than non-experts. However, 
studies comparing experts and non-experts paint a less favourable picture. Goldberg 
(1965) examined the diagnostic accuracy of clinical psychologists and trainees relative to 
patient scores on the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory), and found 
that both groups performed the same (r = .28). Garb (1989) reviewed studies on 
diagnostic accuracy in clinical practice, and concluded that while experienced clinicians 
and graduate students in mental health fields were better than lay judges, the clinicians 
were not any better than the graduate students. Therefore, it was important to have some 
training, but additional experience made little difference. 
In more recent work, Karelaia and Hogarth’s (2008) meta-analysis across a range 
of decision contexts noted that studies involving experts had lower validity (r = .47) than 
those involving trained non-experts (r =  .51) or novices (r = .58). On the other hand, a 
meta-analysis by Spengler et al. (2009) found a small overall effect of educational and 
clinical experience in clinical psychology judgments (d = .12). Do note that Karelaia and 
Hogarth’s findings were between-study comparisons, not within-study, between-group 
comparisons. Therefore, their set of results is purely descriptive and the groups may not 
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necessarily be comparable. On the other hand, Spengler et al.’s meta-analysis is based on 
comparing experts and non-experts performing the same decision tasks. 
Similar research in the personnel assessment and selection arena is lacking, but 
taken together, these findings do suggest that the effects of expertise on judgmental 
accuracy is minimal at best. Research examining how people tend to approach judgment 
and decision making have uncovered a number of reasons for why the use of holistic 
judgment, even when implemented by experts, does not lead to more accurate judgments. 
 
Human Judgmental Processes 
Perhaps the most reliable finding in the judgment and decision making literature 
is that mechanical methods of data combination consistently outperform holistic methods 
across a variety of decision domains. This is not anything new either, as it is a finding 
that has dated back to as early as Meehl (1954). This includes judgments made via a 
range of different mechanical methods such as optimal weighting, unit weighting, and 
bootstrapped “model of man” weights (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove et al., 2000; Kuncel 
et al., 2013). When it comes to predicting job performance in personnel selection 
scenarios, mechanical methods are almost 50% more accurate than holistic methods 
(Kuncel et al., 2013). In their meta-analysis of Lens Model studies, Karelaia and Hogarth 
(2008) demonstrated that the shortcomings of expert judgment are primarily explained by 
inconsistency in applying predictor weights across multiple judgmental cases, and by the 
application of predictor weights that do not accurately reflect the predictor-criterion 
relationships in reality. A number of theoretical explanations for why these issues exist 
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have been proposed, and these are largely traced to an inappropriate use of and 
overconfidence in expert insight. 
Process analyses of expert judgment have shown that experts tend to have some 
prototype in mind regarding what predictors to use when forming their judgments 
(Camerer & Johnson, 1991). In effect, this ends up with experts searching for and using 
only a subset of all the information available to match predictors to their prototype, 
incorporating heuristics7 like representativeness to identify a stereotype from the 
predictor information, and availability regarding ease of recalling instances in which the 
prototype was applicable. For example, take an employer who had unsatisfactory 
experiences with employees who were previously self-employed or were homeschooled. 
Based on this prior experience, he may believe that unconventional experiential 
backgrounds are undesirable in the workplace, and as a result primarily search the type of 
employment and educational information the candidate has rather than what the candidate 
actually did in their previous experiences. Heuristic approaches to judgment and decision 
making provide shortcuts to making more efficient judgments, but the trade-off is that 
some predictor information may be used inconsistently, inaccurately, or even ignored 
from case to case. 
Theoretically, reducing the number of predictor cues and using only the most 
relevant ones could improve expert judgment by reducing cognitive load so that judges 
would be able to more effectively work within the limits of working memory. Judges are 
                                                 
7 A complete discussion of heuristics would be incredibly lengthy and beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Interested readers are directed to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and Shah and Oppenheimer (2008). 
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typically able to work with around 8 pieces of information at a time (Cooksey, 1996), and 
although providing more information can increase confidence in one’s own judgmental 
accuracy, actual accuracy tends not to improve (e.g., Tsai, Klayman, & Hastie, 2008). 
Furthermore, providing additional information that is not relevant to the judgmental task 
in question has been shown to end up reducing predictive accuracy (Nisbett, Zukier, & 
Lemley, 1981). Meta-analytically, the average clinical judgment validity with two 
predictor cues is .63 and drops to .55 with three predictors, and validity is lower when 
there is high redundancy between predictors (r = .54) compared to no redundancy (.66; 
Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). Although it seems that judgment tasks should be made as 
simple as possible to maximise the predictive validity of expert judgment, expert 
judgment tends to be anything but simple as people often attend to wrong or irrelevant 
predictor cues (e.g., improper consideration of broken-leg cues), or combine information 
in unnecessarily complex ways (e.g., attempt to account for configural rules that may not 
actually exist). 
 
Broken Legs and Broken Rules 
Broken-leg cues8 (Meehl, 1954) are a potential application of expert insight in 
judgment and decision making processes. These are rare, but highly diagnostic cues that 
should theoretically override most, if not all, other predictors. Because mechanical 
                                                 
8 “Broken-leg” is in reference to the example used by Meehl (1954) to describe this concept. If a man 
reliably goes to the movies every Thursday, the mechanical model would predict that he would see a movie 
next Thursday. However, if he breaks his leg on Wednesday, the human judge would be able to account for 
this rare occurrence and alter the prediction, now predicting that he would no longer attend the movie. 
Because the mechanical model does not account for this, it would result in an erroneous prediction that he 
would attend movie. A more common term for this concept would be “red flag.” 
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methods typically do not account for broken-leg cues, experts who are able to detect 
these broken-leg cues should be expected to outperform the mechanical method. In 
reality however, they make little difference in prediction as by definition, they are rare 
and opportunities to account for them are few and far in between. Additionally, people 
tend to overperceive and overgeneralize the existence of these cues (Camerer & Johnson, 
1991). People are drawn to them because they tell compelling stories, but this comes at a 
cost of potentially attending to irrelevant information, and ignoring relevant information 
and common sense (Highhouse, 2008). This can be considered a specific case of applying 
incorrect weights by overly focussing on a single piece of information (i.e., more heavily 
weighing one predictor over all others). 
Experts often consider configural rules (i.e., interactions) between predictors to be 
important for maximizing their judgmental accuracy (Camerer & Johnson, 1991). This 
raises two questions: 1) are configural rules representative of the predictor-criterion 
relationships in reality, and 2) do judges actually apply configural rules effectively? The 
answer to both of these questions is “not really.” For example, Sackett, Gruys, and 
Ellingson (1998) demonstrated that ability-personality interactions are rare occurrences 
when predicting job performance even though these reflect a common lay belief about 
performance and Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) showed that a linear model adequately 
describes how experts combine predictor values into an overall judgment, as well as 
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adequately describes the overall predictor-criterion relationships9. In a linear 
bootstrapped “model of man”, the residual term (includes error, configural rules, and 
broken-leg cues) often has a negligible relationship with the criterion (Camerer & 
Johnson, 1991; Dawes, 1971). Yet, as is often the case with broken-leg cues, configural 
rules can also tell compelling stories and may also be overgeneralised (Camerer & 
Johnson, 1991). 
The effect of using broken-leg cues and configural rules (or at least attempting to 
do so) results in data combination schemes that are not consistent with reality wherever 
and whenever these rules are irrelevant or improperly applied. Perceiving broken-leg cues 
or interactions where they don’t actually exist will cause inappropriate and inconsistent 
weighting of predictors. Even in the rare cases where broken-leg cues and/or configural 
rules are relevant, there is no guarantee that expert judges are able to effectively account 
for them and to apply them only when relevant. Expert judgment is still prone to errors, 
and there is no evidence that experts are able to account for all of these interactions and 
all of the occasions in which they should be applied (Kuncel & Highhouse, 2011; Ruscio, 
2003). Over the long run, with opportunities for errors being more common than 
opportunities for expert insight to be truly influential, the mechanical method will come 
out ahead. 
                                                 
9 All that said, “adequate” is a subjective descriptor for some degree to which relationships are quantified 
by a linear model. When interactions do exist, linear models are still decent at capturing them except when 
they are extreme disordinal interactions. In such cases, the use of a linear model versus modelling 
configural rules or non-linearities is an issue of parsimony and whether fitting a more complex model 
results in meaningful improvements in capturing judgmental policies. This dissertation only examines 
linear models as there is no a priori expectation for specific interactions between the predictors of interest, 
and sample size considerations do not confidently permit a thorough search for such interactions. 
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Framing Effects 
 Framing effects provide another explanation for why expert judgment tends to be 
less accurate than mechanical methods of judgment. When evaluating multiple cases, 
mechanical methods can be made to judge each case independently, such that judgments 
made for one case are not influenced by judgments made for a different case. However, 
human judges are susceptible to framing effects that influence whether they make 
absolute or relative judgments. 
 Examples include decoy and phantom effects (Highhouse, 1997). Consider two 
assessment candidates (C1 and C2), with C1 scoring 8/10 and 5/10 on predictors 1 and 2 
(P1 and P2), and C2 scoring 5/10 and 8/10, respectively. If the predictors are equally 
weighted, then the candidates are equally desirable since their overall scores are the same 
(13/20). Now consider that a third candidate is present and scored 8/10 on P1 and 3/10 on 
P2. Equally weighted, this candidate is an inferior option with an overall score of 11/20. 
However, because this candidate outperformed C2 on P1, but never outperformed C1 on 
either predictor, C1 now appears to be the better candidate relative to this decoy 
candidate.  
Now consider another candidate that was present but is no longer available (e.g., 
accepted a different job), a phantom candidate, who scored 10/10 on P1 and 5/10 on P2. 
Equally weighted, this candidate is the superior option with an overall score of 15/20. 
Because the candidate is no longer available, and because people tend to be loss averse 
and want to minimise loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; 1992), C1 also appears to be the 
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better candidate in this case as the loss on P1 relative to the phantom candidate is 
minimised. 
 The assumption in both of these examples is that the two predictors are equally 
desirable. A mechanical method would combine these predictor scores in exactly the 
same way for every candidate, and information about one candidate should not influence 
how the mechanical method rates another candidate. However, because human judges are 
susceptible to framing effects, irrelevant information is introduced that encourages 
relative comparisons to be made with a result of altering the judgmental policy used to 
combine predictor information. In essence, this can be considered a case of inappropriate 
use of configural rules to alter a judgmental policy in the presence of a unique 
informational cue. All that said, these framing effects tend to affect judgments between a 
small number of options, so their effects are likely localised to the options under scrutiny 
rather than the broader judgmental task at hand. 
 
The Folly of Man 
Unfortunately, despite the known shortcomings of expert judgment, people often 
still rely on clinical methods of judgment that are inconsistent and outperformed by 
mechanical methods. People simply prefer to make decisions and have decisions made 
about them based on expert judgment and intuition, and are resistant to the use of 
mechanical methods. A non-exhaustive list of reasons include 1) overconfidence in 
human expertise, 2) an assumption that complex, ill-structured problems require ill-
structured methods, 3) cost of developing an appropriate algorithm, 4) availability of an 
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appropriate algorithm, 5) fear of being replaced by technology, 6) maintenance of self-
concept and identity (i.e., it is someone’s job to make decisions), 7) identifying with a 
specific judgmental theory, 8) viewing mechanical methods as dehumanising, and 9) poor 
awareness and education about the utility of mechanical methods (Highhouse, 2008; 
Kleinmuntz, 1990; Grove & Meehl, 1996). Among the general public, people tend to 
perceive clinical judgment to be more effective that mechanical methods, and they 
describe mechanical methods as unprofessional, impersonal, insufficient, inaccurate, 
unfair, and unethical (Diab et al., 2011; Eastwood et al., 2012). Clearly, pure use of 
mechanical methods for judgment and decision making purposes would not be a popular 
option. 
Ultimately, if we want to improve organisational judgment and decision making 
processes in practice, it will require some combination of addressing these 
misconceptions as well as integrating expert judgment with mechanical methods rather 
than outright replacing expert judgment. To that end, it will be necessary to first gain a 
comprehensive understanding into how expert assessors use and combine information 
into predictive judgments. The three studies presented in this dissertation aim to break 
down expert judgment into its component processes and to decipher the specific 
processes that underlie the shortcomings of expert judgment. 
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Study 1: A Lens Model Decomposition of Individual Assessments 
 
The Lens Model 
 In any judgmental scenario, there is some set of predictor information (i.e., cues) 
that relate to the criterion of interest of which the value is initially unknown. The cues 
provide an indication of the criterion value, and the judge estimates the criterion value by 
combining the information that they perceive from these cues. Essentially, the judge 
views the criterion through the “lens” of these predictor cues. In individual assessments, 
these cues are each candidate’s scores on the various assessment dimensions, which are 
used to predict some desired criterion like job performance. 
This judgmental process is captured by the Lens Model, which has long been used 
as a framework to analyse human judgment across a range of judgment and decision 
making settings. It was first conceptualised by Brunswik (1952) and then first applied 
towards deciphering clinical judgment by Hammond (1955). Using the Lens Model, we 
can evaluate the degree to which expert judgment is consistent with the actual criterion 
values, model how the judge weighs and combines information cues (i.e., capture their 
data combination policy), determine how well the judge’s data combination policy 
matches up with the actual predictor-criterion relationships, and compare expert 
judgments and the judge’s model with other data combination schemes. The 
mathematical formulation of the model that allows for this comprehensive analysis of 
human judgment was further developed by Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (1964), Hursch, 
Hammond, and Hursch (1964), and Tucker (1964).  
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Lens Model Parameters 
The parameters of the Lens Model are shown in Figure 1, and described in detail 
in this section as well as in Table 2. Overall, these parameters quantify: 1) the ecology 
(𝑒), which describes the criterion of interest, 2) the subject (𝑠), which describes the 
clinical judgment of the criterion value, 3) the “lens”, containing the independent variable 
or predictor cues, each bearing some relation to the criterion and providing an indication 
of the criterion value that informs the subject judgments, and 4) the determinants of 
judgmental accuracy.  
 Collected parameters. Three Lens Model parameters are based on collected data, 
and must be obtained before any other parameters can be computed. These are the 
predictor cues (𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑛; where 𝑛 is the number of cues), the criterion value (𝑌𝑒), and the 
subject response (𝑌𝑠), commonly collected as part of a validation effort. In individual 
assessments, the predictor cues would be each candidate’s scores on the assessment 
dimensions, which have been distilled from their specific assessment scores. The subject 
response would be the expert assessor’s overall assessment rating for each candidate they 
evaluate, and the criterion value would be some quantification of each candidate’s actual 
job performance (e.g., supervisory ratings of performance). 
 The “lens”. The critical function of the Lens Model is to describe how the cues 
are related to the criterion, and how the judge uses these cues to predict the criterion. The 
most common method of doing so has been to fit multiple regression models on both 
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sides of the lens. Often, a linear model is assumed, an assumption that has been well 
tested and supported (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). 
The ecological model is a linear function describing the relationship between the 
cues and the criterion in the ecology, such that  
?̂?𝑒 = 𝑏1𝑒𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛𝑒𝑋𝑛 
where 𝑏1𝑒…𝑏𝑛𝑒 are the optimal regression weights for combining the cues 𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑛 into a 
predicted criterion value ?̂?𝑒. The weights obtained from this model describe the relative 
value of each cue in predicting the criterion. 
 The subject model (i.e., bootstrapped “model of man”; see Goldberg, 1970) is a 
linear function describing the relationship between the cues and the subject judgment, 
such that  
?̂?𝑠 = 𝑏1𝑠𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛𝑠𝑋𝑛 
where 𝑏1𝑠 … 𝑏𝑛𝑠 are the optimal regression weights for combining the cues 𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑛 into a 
predicted subject judgment ?̂?𝑠. The weights obtained from this model describe the relative 
importance placed on each predictor cue by the judge in combining the cue information 
into a clinical prediction of the criterion value. 
 Accuracy (𝒓𝒂). Classically referred to as achievement (Hammond et al., 1964; 
Hursch et al., 1964), the criterion-related validity of the clinically judged criterion values 
in predicting the actual criterion values is simply the correlation between the two values: 
𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑌𝑒𝑌𝑠 
 In their meta-analysis of Lens Model studies, Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) found 
that clinical judgment has a moderate to high degree of accuracy (average 𝑟𝑎 = .56). 
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However, this is dwarfed by the validity of an optimally weighted mechanical composite 
(average validity = .81), meaning that whatever the judges are doing in making their 
clinical judgments results in predictive accuracy lower than what could have theoretically 
been achieved. 
 Tucker’s (1964) alternative formulation10 of 𝑟𝑎 more thoroughly details the 
determinants of judgmental accuracy: 
𝑟𝑎 = 𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠 + 𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2) 
Essentially, the accuracy of clinical judgment depends on the degree to which the judge 
combines information mechanically (𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠) plus any insight the judge utilises that is not 
accounted for by the mechanical model (𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2)). Each specific parameter 
in this formulation will be discussed in turn. 
 Environmental predictability (𝑹𝒆). Perhaps evident by its name, environmental 
predictability quantifies the degree to which the ecological value of the criterion is 
predictable from a linear function of the cues. In other words, this is the criterion-related 
validity of an optimally weighted mechanical composite. Mathematically, this is the 
multiple correlation between the observed criterion values and the ecological model-
predicted criterion values: 
𝑅𝑒 = 𝑟𝑌𝑒?̂?𝑒   
                                                 
10 This equation is now often referred to as the Lens Model equation (e.g., Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). 
Ultimately, the Lens Model describes the various aspects of judgment that influence clinical judgment 
accuracy. 
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If 𝑅𝑒 (and 𝑅𝑒
2, the amount of variance in the criterion accounted for by the 
ecological model) is high, then a linear composite of the cues yields good prediction of 
the criterion. If it is low, it could signal that the model is misspecified. In such a case, if 
the judge could account for this unmodeled knowledge, he or she could theoretically 
outperform the mechanical model. However, if the criterion is simply unpredictable, then 
the likelihood of this occurring would be expected to be nil. In reality, environmental 
predictability fares quite well. As mentioned before, the average 𝑅𝑒 = .81 (Karelaia & 
Hogarth, 2008). Furthermore, higher 𝑅𝑒 is correlated with higher 𝑟𝑎 (r = .43) such that 
clinical judgments are more accurate if the criterion is more predictable (Karelaia & 
Hogarth, 2008). 
 Cognitive control (𝑹𝒔). On the other side of the lens, cognitive control is the 
degree to which the subject judgments are predictable from a linear function of the cues, 
and is the multiple correlation between the subject judgments and the “model of man” 
predicted judgments: 
𝑅𝑠 = 𝑟𝑌𝑠?̂?𝑠 
 Practically, what 𝑅𝑠 (and 𝑅𝑠
2, the amount of variance in the subject judgments 
accounted for by the “model of man”) captures is whether the judge applies the same 
linear data combination policy consistently across judgments. Karelaia and Hogarth 
(2008) found that cognitive control is typically quite high, where the average 𝑅𝑠 = .80, 
and it has a decent correlation with 𝑟𝑎 (r = .56). Therefore, consistently applying a single 
data combination policy is an important contributing factor to the accuracy of clinical 
judgment.  
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 Cue sensitivity (𝑮). This is also known as mechanical knowledge or a matching 
index, and is given as the correlation between the predicted criterion values and predicted 
judgments: 
𝐺 = 𝑟?̂?𝑒?̂?𝑠  
It determines how well the “model of man” matches up with the ecological model. 
Because the weights in the ecology are modelled linearly, this is dependent not only on 
whether the judge uses weights that are consistent in magnitude and sign to the ecology, 
but also whether the judge applies these weights in a linear form. Cue sensitivity tends to 
be quite high (average 𝐺 = .80; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008), but the fact that linear models 
are quite robust to changes in cue weights (Dawes, 1979; Waller, 2008) suggests that it 
would be possible to obtain high levels of 𝐺 even with weights that do not appear similar 
on the surface. Interestingly, 𝐺 is correlated with 𝑅𝑠 (r = .43) indicating that judges who 
are more consistent are better able to match the ecology, but on the other hand it is not 
well correlated with 𝑅𝑒 (r = .10), indicating that judges can match the ecology regardless 
of its predictability. 
 Unmodeled knowledge (𝑪). Although 𝑅𝑒 and 𝑅𝑠 are typically quite high, they are 
not perfect. Therefore, there is often some information that is left unmodeled in either or 
both the ecology and the subject. This could be random error or systematic error due to 
model misspecification such as: unmodeled cues, unmodeled interactions between cues, 
or the functional form of the model should be non-linear (Cooksey, 1996; Einhorn, 1974). 
An imperfect model has non-zero residual terms, which are the difference between the 
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observed and predicted values for each observed case. For the ecological model, the 
residuals are computed as: 
𝑌𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑌𝑒 − ?̂?𝑒 
For the “model of man”, the residuals are computed as: 
𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑌𝑠 − ?̂?𝑠 
 If the clinical judgments contain any insight not accounted for by the ecological 
model, this is captured as unmodeled knowledge, which is the correlation between the 
residuals from the two models: 
𝐶 = 𝑟 𝑌𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑌𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
On average, unmodeled knowledge is very low (average 𝐶 = .04), so there tends to be 
almost no room for improvement beyond the mechanical ecological model (Karelaia & 
Hogarth, 2008).  
 In the Lens Model equation, the unmodeled component of clinical judgment 
accuracy is computed as: 
𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2) 
This is equivalent to the covariance between the residual terms from the ecological model 
and from the “model of man”. Functionally, this quantifies the portion of the unmodeled 
knowledge that contributes to predictive validity. If the environmental predictability is 
high, then the variance not accounted for by the ecological model (1 − 𝑅𝑒
2) is low, so the 
unmodeled knowledge would make less of a difference in explaining the ecology. 
Similarly, if cognitive control is high, then the variance not accounted for by the “model 
of man” (1 − 𝑅𝑠
2) is low, so the unmodeled knowledge would make less of a difference 
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in explaining the subject judgments. Additionally, if the amount of unmodeled 
knowledge is zero, then the Lens Model equation will simply be the modeled, mechanical 
component: 
𝑟𝑎 =  𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠  (if 𝐶 = 0) 
 Parameter composites. From the mechanical component, a few additional and 
informative parameter composites can be computed. 
 The first is performance (Lindell, 1976) or linear cognitive ability (Hogarth & 
Karelaia, 2007), which “…quantifies the human, as opposed to the environmental, 
contribution to achievement and captures the extent to which judges both match task 
requirements and are consistent in the execution of their strategies” (Karelaia & Hogarth, 
2008, p. 406). It is the correlation between the subject judgments and the predicted 
criterion values, and is equivalent to the product of the cue sensitivity and cognitive 
control parameters: 
𝐺𝑅𝑠 = 𝑟𝑌𝑠?̂?𝑒  
On average, 𝐺𝑅𝑠 is quite high (.66), and higher than 𝑟𝑎 (.56), so judges appear to be better 
at predicting the predicted criterion values than the observed criterion values (Karelaia & 
Hogarth, 2008). 
 Second is the validity of the bootstrapped “model of man” (Goldberg, 1970), 
which is how well the judge’s average model would predict the criterion if it was applied 
completely consistently across all judgments. It can be computed as the product between 
the cue sensitivity and environmental predictability parameters: 
𝐺𝑅𝑒 = 𝑟𝑌𝑒?̂?𝑠 
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Lastly, we can subtract clinical judgmental accuracy from the validity of the 
“model of man”: 
𝐺𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑎 
This provides a measure of how well judges would have done if they had applied their 
average data combination policy consistently instead of whatever it is they did in making 
their own clinical judgments. Goldberg (1970) first demonstrated the superiority of the 
“model of man” over the judges themselves. On average, the validity of the bootstrapped 
model is .65, with an average increment above clinical judgment of .10 (Karelaia & 
Hogarth, 2008). 
 
Filling in the Blanks 
 As discussed extensively in prior sections, there is a strong reliance on clinical, 
expert judgment in combining information from individual assessments and concerns that 
this results in validity that is lower than what could be achieved if the assessment 
information was combined mechanically. Viewing individual assessments through the 
Lens Model will help to better quantify the degree to which expert judgment is 
detrimental to predictive validity and the underlying processes that affect the validity of 
expert judgment. 
 Additionally, the majority of Lens Model studies have been conducted in the 
laboratory, which likely limits the generalisability of past research. In their meta-analysis, 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) included 65 field studies out of 248 total studies (26%), so 
clearly there is a dearth of field studies among this literature. Furthermore, there are a 
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couple of indications that their results may not generalise well towards individual 
assessments. The predictive validity for job performance using a clinical composite of 
predictors is .28 (Kuncel et al., 2013), and the predictive validity of individual 
assessments is .30 (Morris et al., 2015). This is substantially lower than the clinical 
judgment accuracy found by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), which is .56. Also, their result 
for the validity of an optimal mechanical composite is .81, which is almost double that of 
the population validity specifically for job performance using a mechanical composite of 
predictors at .44 (Kuncel et al., 2013).  
In light of these issues, a Lens Model decomposition of individual assessments 
will serve to fill gaps in both individual assessment and Lens Model research. All of the 
aforementioned Lens Model parameters are computed using individual assessment 
validation datasets from two organisations, one of which conducted two separate 
validation studies, for a total of three validation datasets. This allows for the Lens Model 
to be examined between-organisations, as well as across two different samples at the 
same organisation. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Although the magnitudes of the Lens Model parameters found in prior research 
may not be completely consistent with what is expected to be obtained from individual 
assessments, there is no prior indication that the overall patterns would not apply. 
Mechanical data combinations still outperform clinical combinations in predicting job 
performance (Kuncel et al., 2013), but the mechanical (𝑅𝑒) and clinical (𝑟𝑎) validities for 
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individual assessments would be expected to be closer to .44 and .28, respectively than 
.81 and .56, respectively (Hypothesis 1).  
Other expectations include: 
- Hypothesis 2: The bootstrapped “model of man” will outperform the experts’ 
judgments (𝐺𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑎 > 0) 
- Hypothesis 3: Observed criterion values and subject judgments are 
sufficiently modelled by multiple linear regression (i.e., low unmodeled 
knowledge; 𝐶 < .10) 
- Hypothesis 4: Judges may be able to but are not perfect in using cue weights 
that are consistent with ecological weights in either or both magnitude and 
rank order (i.e., moderate to high cue sensitivity; .50 < 𝐺 < 1.00 ) 
- Hypothesis 5: Judges have some cue weighting policy that they typically use, 
but are inconsistent in their application of a single cue weighting policy across 
all judgments (i.e., moderate to high cognitive control; .50 < 𝑅𝑠 < 1.00) 
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Method 
  
Sample 
Three archival assessment validation datasets were obtained from an international 
management consulting firm11: 1) Company A, a financial services provider (231 
candidates evaluated by 26 assessors between 1994 and 1997), 2) Company B, a food 
retailer, Sample 1 (195 candidates evaluated by 23 assessors between 1980 and 1988), 
and 3) Company B, Sample 2 (421 candidates evaluated by 30 assessors between 1989 
and 1999). Sample 1 and Sample 2 from Company B were obtained from separate 
validation studies. Candidates were evaluated for management positions by doctoral-level 
psychologists trained in assessment. 
Based on their performance on a mix of in-basket, interviews, leaderless group 
discussions, personality test, and cognitive ability test, candidates were rated on seven 
assessment dimensions: adjustment, administration, communication, interpersonal, 
judgment, leadership, and motivation. Using these dimension ratings, the assessors then 
combined each of their candidates’ ratings on these dimensions into an overall 
assessment rating based on person-job fit12. Supervisory ratings of job performance are 
used as the criterion variable. 
                                                 
11 The identity of the consulting firm is kept anonymous as the results of this dissertation do not paint a 
positive picture. Their willingness to share the data that make this dissertation possible is much appreciated. 
For readers are somehow able to guess the identity of this firm, please note that this data is considered 
legacy data that do not necessarily reflect their current assessment practices.  
 
12 Employees who fit better with their job are expected to show higher job performance (Kristof-Brown, 
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005) 
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Missing data were handled by multiple imputation with predictive mean matching 
(Schenker & Taylor, 1996). This method randomly samples donor values from 
neighbouring observations that has a predicted value closest to the predicted value of the 
missing value. As it samples values from existing data, it maintains the plausibility of the 
imputed values compared to other regression-based methods. Using the MICE (Multiple 
Imputation by Chained Equations) package in R (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 
2011), five imputed datasets were generated for each of the three archival datasets, and 
analyses for each archival dataset were pooled across all five imputed datasets. 
Analyses were conducted using both listwise deletion and multiple imputation. 
Conclusions were the same for both methods of handling missing data. Because listwise 
deletion is the less preferable option and for the sake of brevity, only results obtained via 
multiple imputation will be presented.  
 
Analyses 
 Lens Model parameters were calculated as described in Table 2. All regression 
modelling were conducted using ordinary least squares multiple regression. Due to low 
within-assessor sample sizes, the analysis was completed at the level of each individual 
dataset13. 
Results were first examined for each dataset separately, and then sample-size 
weighted to aggregate the results across all three datasets. The Lens Model parameters 
                                                 
13 This data limitation of low within-assessor sample sizes is a characteristic common to many Lens Model 
studies. This necessitates deriving the Lens Model for an aggregate of assessors instead of individual 
assessors (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). 
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obtained by Karelaia and Hogarth’s (2008) meta-analysis of Lens Model studies and the 
clinical and mechanical validity results from Kuncel et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis were 
used to benchmark the parameters obtained in this study. 
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Results 
 
 Lens Model parameters for all three organisational validation data sources and the 
sample size weighted parameters are presented in Table 5, along with corresponding 
values from Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) and Kuncel et al. (2013). 
 Across all three datasets, the validity of expert judgment (accuracy; sample size 
weighted average 𝑟𝑎 = .16) was far lower than what would be optimally expected from 
the environmental predictability (average 𝑅𝑒 = .31). Examining the mechanical and 
clinical components of judgmental accuracy reveal that on average, the mechanical 
component contributed more to accuracy than accuracy itself (average 𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠 = .17), and 
it was the unmodeled component that was detrimental to accuracy (average 
𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2) = -.01). Simply put, if the expert assessors had relied on a more 
mechanical approach, they would have done slightly better than they did. The exception 
was with Company A, where the contribution of the unmodeled component was slightly 
positive (𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2) = .03), but even then, it was mostly the mechanical 
component that drove accuracy (𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠 = .12). 
The expert assessors’ lack of a mechanical approach could be seen in the 
cognitive control parameter. Although cognitive control was relatively high (average 𝑅𝑠 
= .77), it was not perfect, so the experts’ judgments were not completely linear or 
consistent. Cue sensitivity was also relatively high (average 𝐺 = .71) but not perfect, 
indicating that the expert assessors have some idea of how to weigh the different 
assessment dimensions, but did not necessarily implement a weighting scheme close to 
optimal. The composites of 𝐺 and 𝑅𝑠 were modest (average 𝐺𝑅𝑠 = .55), so while the 
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assessors had somewhat defined judgmental policies, they were far from optimal and far 
from being applied consistently. Unmodeled knowledge was essentially zero (average 𝐶 
= -.02), with the negative values of unmodeled knowledge indicating that the non-linear 
aspects of the experts’ judgments may actually be harming prediction. 
 Looking at the validities of the “models of man”, they either matched or 
outperformed the expert assessors’ own judgments (average 𝐺𝑅𝑒 = .23) in prediction. 
The difference was the most pronounced at Company B, Sample 1 (𝐺𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑎 = .16), 
whereas the validity of the “model of man” at Company A matched that of the assessors 
themselves (𝐺𝑅𝑒 − 𝑟𝑎 = 0). In no case did the assessor beat their own model.  
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Discussion 
 
 Consistent with what has been found in the Lens Model and broader judgment 
and decision making literature, the Lens Model analysis of expert judgment in individual 
assessments conducted in this study show that on average, the predictive validity of 
expert judgment is far from optimal. In fact, the non-mechanical approaches to judgment 
used by these expert assessors to evaluate their candidates either contribute basically no 
additional validity or actually end up harming validity, evidenced by the near-zero or 
negative values for unmodeled knowledge. This study does not evaluate the reasons for 
why the assessors stray from a mechanical judgment approach, but rather simply finds 
that they do. Prior research suggests a multitude of reasons, including overconfidence in 
human expertise, assuming that complex problems require complex solutions, personal 
theories about how judgments and decisions should be made, and poor training or 
education (e.g., Grove & Meehl, 1996; Kleinmuntz, 1990). 
 That said, a subjective judgment policy is not in itself undesirable. If the experts 
could indeed do the things described by Silzer and Jeannert (2011) to integrate 
information in complex but valid ways, there may be a good deal of subjective judgment 
and inconsistency in judgment applied across cases as the experts evaluate information 
differently from case to case. The key here though, is that they do so in a manner that 
maximises predictive validity and not in a manner that introduces more error. 
Unfortunately, across all three samples studied here, this is not the case. While the 
experts demonstrate a decent amount of cue sensitivity, their judgmental policies are still 
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not close to optimal. They also demonstrate a decent amount of cognitive control, but are 
still far from perfect consistency.  
 When comparing the experts with their models (i.e., the “model of man”), they 
are either matched or outperformed by their model, and this exemplifies the issue of 
consistency. Even if the experts’ judgmental policies are not optimal, simply applying 
their own average policies consistently across all candidates would have yielded 
predictive validity as good as, if not better than that of their own judgments, and would 
have contributed towards making a more optimal prediction. Despite the fact that such a 
result was observed as early as Goldberg (1970), it is unfortunate that the problem still 
persists decades later. 
 The values of the Lens Model parameters obtained in this study are found to be 
lower across the board compared to those from Karelaia and Hogarth’s (2008) meta-
analysis of Lens Model studies and Kuncel et al.’s (2013) meta-analysis of predicting job 
performance using clinical versus mechanical data combinations. This is especially the 
case for parameters directly related to predictive validity. These values were expected to 
be closer to Kuncel et al.’s (2013) values for clinical and mechanical judgment validity 
than to those from Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) as the bulk of the Lens Model meta-
analysis was based on lab studies and not real-world judgment data.  
Although the parameter values from this study are indeed closer to Kuncel et al. 
(2013), they are still a fair bit lower. This may be due to the fact that Kuncel et al.’s meta-
analysis was not purely based on individual assessment judgments, but rather judgments 
of job performance made across a variety of predictors including cognitive ability. On 
 48 
 
average, scores on cognitive ability measures have been shown to be the single best 
predictor of job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), so the inclusion of predictors 
with greater predictive validity than individual assessments is likely driving this 
difference14. However, the average validity of expert judgment found in this study is still 
lower than that of Morris et al.’s (2015) meta-analysis specific to using individual 
assessments to predict job performance (observed mean r = .24; corrected for criterion 
unreliability mean r = .30). This may simply be due to sampling error as it does fall 
within the 95% credibility interval, but it does suggest that the expert assessors in the 
three samples used for this study are performing worse than average. 
By decomposing expert judgment in individual assessments into its component 
processes through this Lens Model analysis, it has become clear that the value of 
expertise in this case is essentially nil. Both the actual predictor-criterion relationships 
and the experts’ judgments are well-captured by linear models, so there is little to no 
opportunity for the expert to improve upon a mechanical judgment. Even if there is room 
for improvement, their lack of insight into what truly constitutes an optimal judgmental 
policy and the inconsistency with which they evaluate their candidates detriments any 
inroads they may make toward beating the mechanical model. The ability of experts to 
validly integrate information in complex ways and the impacts of judgmental optimality 
and consistency are further explored in Study 2 and Study 3. 
  
                                                 
14 Although cognitive ability tests were included in the individual assessments used for this study, their 
information was not directly used by the expert assessors. Rather, they were incorporated into higher-order 
dimension ratings. It is possible that some validity may have been lost in doing so. 
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Study 2: Local versus Non-Local Models of Expert Judgment 
 
The Value and Cost of Using Expert Insight 
One takeaway from Silzer and Jeanneret (2011) regarding the value of 
implementing individual assessments with expert judgment is that expert insight can be 
applied to tailor judgments to the unique characteristics of each organisation. As a result, 
applying expertise in such a way would be expected to maximise the predictive power of 
the assessment system used in each organisation. They believe that an individual 
assessment: 
- “provides professional insight into the individual’s future job performance, 
potential for higher-level positions, and potential to be successful in changing 
organizational demands” (p. 273) 
- “gauges the individual’s fit with the immediate manager, the peer 
management team, the existing direct reports and organizational structure, the 
organizational culture, the company values, and the country culture” (p. 273) 
- “can be adapted to changing organizational contextual variables and job 
demands” (p. 273) 
Job-specific and organisation-specific characteristics affect a variety of work-
related outcomes, including job performance (Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007), 
and it is possible that complex relationships (e.g., non-linear relationships and configural 
rules) between individuals, jobs and organisations are not adequately accounted for by a 
simple linear weighting model. If expert assessors are able to adjust their data 
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combination polices to tailor their judgments of individual candidates to the job and 
organisational characteristics at hand in a valid manner, it would certainly be valuable to 
the organisation. 
However, attempts to utilise expert insight would end up as being 
counterproductive if it introduces more error rather than predictive validity. As discussed 
previously, the ecology is often adequately captured by a linear model, so opportunities 
for expert insight to be exercised will be rare. Furthermore, in those rare cases, it is then 
dependent on the assessor to exercise his or her insight in a valid manner. Results from 
Study 1 showed that there is little unmodeled knowledge such that there is little 
opportunity for expert insight to add incremental prediction beyond the mechanical 
model. It also showed that the assessors are typically inaccurate and inconsistent when 
making judgments. As a result, even if the assessors attempt to use their expertise to 
integrate information in complex ways, over the long run, human errors take their toll on 
validity. 
 
Testing the Existence of Expert Insight 
 Because the belief that experts provide insight into job and organizational 
characteristics is still a pervasive argument for the use of expert judgment in individual 
assessments, the aim of Study 2 is to test a specific and often touted application of 
expertise. This is with regard to whether expert assessors are actually able to utilise valid 
insight to optimally tailor their judgments for the organisations for which they conduct 
assessments. This involves a comparison of judgmental policies that are local and non-
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local to their respective organisations. Essentially, this tests models capturing the expert 
assessors’ judgmental policies in cross-validation. The cross-validity of optimal 
regression models have been examined in past research, where optimal weights applied to 
a new test sample still outperformed clinical judgment in prediction (Dawes, 1974; 
Kuncel et al., 2013).  
While it has been well-established that the judge’s model outperforms the judge in 
evaluating the same sample (Dawes, 1974; Goldberg, 197), what is unclear is whether the 
bootstrapped “model of man” will perform better, worse, or about the same as expert 
assessors in a completely new sample. This includes evaluating the predictive validity of 
a model derived from one sample in making predictions in a different sample, as well as 
evaluating the predictive validity of models derived from multiple different sources in the 
same sample. 
 In this study, average judgmental policies (i.e., “model of man”) are captured 
using data from two organisations (organisation-specific models), and in two separate 
samples for one of those organisations (sample-specific models). An additional model is 
derived by aggregating across hundreds of organisations (general model). The local 
(source from which the model was derived) predictive validity and non-local validities 
for each model are evaluated. Additionally, the validities of these “models of man” are 
compared to the validities of other, more sterile (i.e., not involving any human input), 
mechanical methods of data combination: unit weighting via simple sums and optimal 
regression weights. 
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Hypotheses 
 In comparing expert judgment with the mechanical methods (“model of man”, 
simple sums, optimal regression weights), the mechanical methods are all expected to 
outperform expert judgment (Hypothesis 1). Optimal regression weights are expected to 
perform the best, but there is an open question as to whether the “model of man” or 
simple sums will predict better (Hypothesis 2). 
If expert insight is valid, the local model is expected to outperform any non-local 
model. More specifically: 
- Hypothesis 3a: If expert insight is valid, the model local to one specific 
organisational sample should outperform the model from a different 
organisational sample or from a model not specific to any one organisation 
(i.e., the general model) 
On the other hand, if expert insight is nonexistent or invalid, the local model would not 
be expected to outperform a non-local model, and it may be possible that by chance a 
non-local model ends up outperforming the local model. More specifically: 
- Hypothesis 3b: If expert insight is not valid, the model local to one specific 
organisational sample would not outperform the model from a different 
organisational sample or from a model not specific to any one organisation 
(i.e., the general model) 
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Method 
 
Sample 
Study 2 uses the three archival individual assessment validation datasets from 
Study 1. 
An additional archival, general individual assessment dataset was obtained from 
the same international management consulting firm, containing assessment data for 
16,143 candidates evaluated by 176 assessors at 683 organisations between 1971 and 
2000. It contains the dimension ratings and overall assessment ratings for each candidate, 
but is not a complete validation dataset as it does not contain criterion variables. 
Therefore, it is possible to model the subject side of the Lens Model with this dataset, but 
not the ecology side. 
Missing data were handled using the multiple imputation procedure described in 
Study 1. Analyses were conducted using both listwise deletion and multiple imputation. 
Conclusions were the same for both methods of handling missing data. Because listwise 
deletion is the less preferable option and for the sake of brevity, only results obtained via 
multiple imputation will be presented.  
 
Validity Analyses 
 An example analytical plan for Company A is depicted in Figure 2. The same 
analysis was conducted for Company B, Sample 1, and Company B, Sample 2, except the 
local and non-local assessor models will be specific to each source dataset. 
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Based on the method described in Study 1, a “model of man” was derived for 
each dataset, resulting in models capturing the average judgmental policies from four 
different sources: 1) Company A, 2) Company B, Sample 1, 3) Company B, Sample 2, 
and 3) the general assessment dataset. All four models were applied to the first three 
sources to combine the assessment dimensions into “model of man” overall assessment 
ratings, and correlated with supervisory ratings of job performance to determine each 
model’s predictive validity for each validation source. The models were not applied to 
combine information from the general assessment dataset as it did not contain job 
performance information.  
The predictive validities of overall ratings made using two other “sterile” 
mechanical methods – unit weighting via simple sums and optimal regression weighting 
– were computed to benchmark the validities of expert judgment and the “models of 
man” against methods that do not involve human input. Unit weighted overall ratings via 
simple sums were calculated by simply adding up each candidates’ dimension ratings. 
Correlating this with their job performance yielded the predictive validity of a simple unit 
weighted composite. Optimal weighted overall ratings were calculated by first obtaining 
the optimal weights by extracting the regression coefficients from an ordinary least 
squares multiple linear regression model using the candidates’ dimension ratings to 
predict their job performance. Each candidates’ dimension ratings were then linearly 
combined using these optimal weights into an optimally weighted composite. Correlating 
this composite score with their job performance yielded the predictive validity of an 
optimally weighted composite. To adjust for sampling error in estimating the optimal 
 55 
 
models, the correlation between optimal weighted ratings and job performance were 
adjusted from sample-observed values to the population level via the Wherry formula-1 
(Yin & Fan, 2001).  
 
Relative Weights Analyses 
Relative weights analyses were conducted to answer two questions. First, whether 
it would be meaningful to tailor judgments to organisations. Answering this question 
involved comparing the optimal models obtained from each source to determine whether 
they are indeed different. The second question is whether the assessors, on average, were 
actually combining information differently at different organisations. This was a 
comparison between the “model of man” from each source to determine whether they are 
indeed different as the goal of this study is to determine whether observed differences in 
data combination policies reflect valid tailoring of judgments to specific organisations, or 
if it is simply due to error in judgment.  
To compare models derived from different data sources, it would be necessary to 
evaluate the relative influence of each predictor on the whole model. The relative weight 
for each predictor (assessment dimension) was simply calculated by taking the proportion 
of weight given to each predictor relative to the sum of all weights in the model. 
Similarity or dissimilarity between models was determined by comparing the structure of 
the relative weights between models and examining whether the same dimension was 
weighted the same or differently in different models. This analysis was done separately 
for the ecology (optimal) models and the “models of man”. 
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Results 
 
Relative Weights 
Results from the relative weights analysis for the ecology models are shown in 
Figure 3. Clearly, the ecology models are all different. For example, the model from 
Company B, Sample 2 gives an overwhelming amount of weight to the administrative 
dimension (relative weight = .58) whereas Company A and Company B, Sample 2 gives 
much less weight to the administrative dimension (relative weight = .18 and .24, 
respectively). Therefore, in order to maximise predictive validity at specific 
organisations, it would be necessary to tailor judgments towards each organisation in a 
valid manner. 
Results from the relative weights analysis for the subject models are shown in 
Figure 4. Like the ecology models, it is apparent that the subject models are all different. 
For example, the model from Company A gives basically no weight to the motivation 
dimension (relative weight = .01), and Company B, Sample 2 gives little weight to the 
motivation dimension (relative weight = .04). The model from the general assessment 
dataset gives a more substantive weight to the motivation dimension (relative weight = 
.08), and the model from Company B, Sample 1 gives an even greater amount of weight 
(relative weight = .20). Therefore, the assessors are combining the assessment dimension 
information differently at different organisations on average. The question then is 
whether these differences are due to valid tailoring of judgments to organisations, or 
simply error. 
 
 57 
 
Validity Analyses 
 Validities for all judgmental methods examined across all three validation datasets 
are presented in Table 6. At Company A (Figure 5), the predictive validity of the 
assessors’ expert judgments (r = .17) was matched by the validity of their model (r = .17). 
This local model performed about the same as the non-local models (average non-local r 
= .17), and also about the same as unit weighting via simple sums (r = .19). 
Unsurprisingly, optimal weights yielded the best predictive validity (r = .28; adjusted r = 
.21). 
 At Company B, Sample 1 (Figure 6), the predictive validity of the assessors’ 
expert judgments (r = .20) was outperformed by the validity of their model (r = .36). This 
local model performed about the same as the non-local models (average non-local r = 
.32), and also about the same as unit weighting via simple sums (r = .35). Again, optimal 
weights yielded the best predictive validity (r = .41; adjusted r = .37). 
At Company B, Sample 2 (Figure 7), the predictive validity of the assessors’ 
expert judgments (r = .13) was also outperformed by the validity of their model (r = .20). 
This local model performed about the same as the non-local models (average non-local r 
= .23), and also about the same as unit weighting via simple sums (r = .24). Again, 
optimal weights yielded the best predictive validity (r = .30; adjusted r = .28). 
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Discussion 
 
The relative weights analyses demonstrated that job performance at different 
organisations is predicted differently by the assessment dimensions (although some of 
these apparent differences are likely due to sampling error). Therefore, each organisation 
is indeed unique with regard to job performance indicators, and assessors should tailor 
their judgmental policies to be in line with the dimensions most important for predicting 
performance. It is also the case that assessors combine information differently at different 
organisations as the assessor models at different organisations are also different. Ideally, 
these differences would be due to valid use of expertise to tailor judgments to 
organisations and not due to errors in judgment. 
However, there does not appear to be strong evidence of valid expertise in 
tailoring candidate evaluations to specific organisations. Assessor models matched or 
outperformed the assessors themselves regardless of where the model was derived. The 
local models of assessors performed similar to non-local models of assessors across all 
organisations suggesting that expert insight, modelled as linear weights, does not appear 
to improve the predictive power of a mechanical combination. This was regardless of 
whether the local model was compared to a non-local model obtained from a different 
organisation, from a different sample from the same organisation, or from an aggregate of 
organisations.  
These models of expert judgment also did not substantially outperform “sterile” 
mechanical methods that do not involve expert judgment (i.e., simple sums and optimal 
weighting). However, the advantage of using mechanical methods based on a model of 
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expert judgment rather than simple unit weights is that it allows us to retain expert 
judgment but still apply expert judgment in a way that improves predictive power over 
expert judgment itself. This allows experts’ judgmental policies to be applied completely 
consistently as the experts themselves were shown to be inconsistent in their combining 
of dimension ratings into overall assessment ratings across candidates. That said, the 
source of the assessor models (i.e., local or non-local to the target organization) does not 
appear to be an important determinant of predictive power. 
It should be noted that at Company A, the mechanical methods only marginally 
outperformed the assessor’s expert judgments, while the mechanical methods dominated 
the assessors’ judgments at Company B. Based on the R2 values of the assessor models, 
assessors at Company A were slightly more consistent in their use of a common set of 
linear dimension weights across candidates than at Company B, and this better 
consistency may have put their judgments closer to those of mechanical methods. Other 
possible explanations would be that either performance at Company A was inherently 
more difficult to predict, or that the dimension ratings were not strong predictors of 
performance at Company A. Therefore, while mechanical methods of prediction were 
found to consistently outperform clinical methods, the degree to which they dominate 
may depend on the actual predictability of the criterion of interest, and the strength of the 
predictor-criterion relationships. 
Comparing the dimension weights from the assessor models to those from the 
optimal models, the weights from the assessor models had little consistency with the 
weights for optimally predicting job performance. In other words, the assessment 
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dimensions considered most important by the assessors do not reflect the dimensions that 
are, in reality, the most important for predicting actual job performance. Given this 
finding, another reason why clinical methods of judgment may be less accurate than 
mechanical methods is that the average assessor is combining predictor information using 
suboptimal weights. 
Based on these observations, the ability of expert assessors to produce overall 
candidate ratings that accurately predict candidates’ job performance is impacted by both 
their use of suboptimal (or not-at-all optimal) weighting schemes as well as the 
inconsistency with which they apply their weighting schemes. The local versus non-local 
assessor model comparisons give the impression that the actual weights do not matter as 
much as the fact that mechanical methods are able to consistently apply a set of weights 
across all cases. Study 3 evaluates the influence of consistently weighting predictors over 
optimally weighting predictors in terms of maximising predictive validity. 
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Study 3: Comparing Random Weighting Schemes with Expert Judgments 
 
An Inconsistent Truth 
Although we have empirically come to understand experts’ judgmental processes, 
an additional issue is that even experts tend to lack insight into their own judgmental 
policies (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Clearly, it would be difficult to apply predictor weights 
consistently without a firm grasp of one’s own judgmental policy. This is where 
mechanical methods of judgment shine because they are guaranteed to consistently apply 
a single set of predictor weights across every single judgmental case15. With mechanical 
methods, we know specifically what judgmental policy is being used and that it is being 
applied consistently. That said, inconsistency does not always indicate inaccuracy. For 
example, if the expert assessors are able to validly account for broken-leg cues, 
interactions, or other non-linearities, their judgmental policies will likely vary from case 
to case as they incorporate different pieces of information into their judgments or weigh 
information cues differently. The key word here, though, is “validly” as attempts to do so 
often end up turning out for the worse. 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that expert judgment is outperformed by mechanical 
methods of data combination, and that this is explained by both use of inaccurate weights 
                                                 
15 Obviously, it would possible to create an algorithm that applies predictor weighting policies in an 
inconsistent manner, but as discussed previously, the operational definition of a mechanical data 
combination in this dissertation is the consistent application of a single data combination policy across all 
judgmental cases. 
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in combining predictor information (low cue sensitivity) as well as inconsistent use of 
these weighting policies (low cognitive control). Recall the Lens Model equation: 
𝑟𝑎 = 𝐺𝑅𝑒𝑅𝑠 + 𝐶√(1 − 𝑅𝑒2)(1 − 𝑅𝑠2) 
Here, clinical judgment accuracy (𝑟𝑎) is dependent on both cue sensitivity (𝐺) and 
cognitive control (𝑅𝑠). When judges use optimal cue weights that reflect the actual 
predictor-criterion relationships and/or use their weighting policy consistently, their 
judgmental accuracy will increase accordingly.  
This raises the question of whether it is the use of accurate (optimal) weighting 
schemes or the consistency with which a weighting scheme is applied that drives the 
predictive power of a judgmental method, or if they are equally influential. Past evidence 
suggests that consistency is more important than optimality. As seen in Study 2, all of the 
mechanical models were able to match or outperform expert judgment to a similar degree 
in each sample regardless of the type of mechanical model or the specific predictor 
weights represented in each model. Linear models are robust (Dawes, 1979), meaning 
that changes in predictor weights do not drastically impact their predictive power as long 
as the signs on the weights do not change (i.e., positive weights stay positive, and 
negative weights stay negative). In multiple regression with three or more predictors, an 
infinite class of alternate regression weights (i.e., fungible weights) can be generated that 
yield a predictive validity approaching that of the optimal set of predictor weights 
(Waller, 2008). Moreover, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) found that on average, a 
mechanical combination using random weights applied consistently across all judgmental 
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cases was able to match or outperform human judges across five different judgment and 
decision making scenarios.  
 
Determining the Effects of Consistency on Judgmental Accuracy 
Study 3 is an extensive extension of Dawes and Corrigan (1974) to more 
thoroughly study the degree to which inconsistency in combining information when 
making multiple judgments is detrimental to the predictive validity of expert judgment. 
Because judgmental processes involve two aspects of data combination – the optimality 
of the data combination policy and the consistency with which the policy is applied – it 
would be necessary to tease apart consistency from optimality if the effects of 
consistency are to be studied. This can be done by examining random weighting schemes 
as there is no expectation of optimality, and pitting expert judgment against random 
weights in combining predictor information. When the intent is to make the most accurate 
judgment possible, randomly weighting information cues to make a judgment is the 
complete opposite of using a set of optimal regression weights. 
There are two forms of random weighting that warrant consideration. The first 
form is the one used by Dawes and Corrigan (1974), where a set of random weights is 
generated, and applied consistently to every single judgmental case. In a simulation 
study, this is repeated many times so that the average validity of consistent use of random 
weights can be estimated. The second form is completely random weighting, where a set 
of random weights is generated for every single judgmental case. Here, no two judgments 
are combined using the same weighting policy (unless by coincidence). Again, this 
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process is repeated many times to estimate the average validity of truly random 
weighting. With consistent random weights, there is no expectation of optimality, but 
there is an expectation of consistency. With completely random weights on the other 
hand, there is no expectation of either optimality or consistency. 
In this study, these two random weighting approaches are applied through a 
Monte Carlo simulation. In contrast to Dawes and Corrigan (1974), where only the 
average validity of consistent random weights was evaluated, this study additionally 
examines the average validity of completely random weights, as well as the complete 
distributions of validities across all simulation trials for these two random weighting 
approaches. By comparing the validity of subjective expert judgment and non-random 
mechanical methods such as unit weighting via simple sums and optimal regression 
weights in the context of the distributions of random but consistent and truly random 
weighting, we can more precisely determine the extent to which non-random methods of 
prediction outperform or do not outperform these random methods. 
 
Hypotheses 
 Like Study 2, the optimal regression weighting method is expected to show the 
highest predictive validity for job performance, followed by either the “model of man” or 
simple sums (Hypothesis 1). All three of these methods are expected to outperform expert 
judgment (Hypothesis 2).  
Optimal regression weighting is expected to outperform the random weighting 
methods in almost all cases, save any case where the random weights coincidentally 
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approach the optimal weights (Hypothesis 3). Unit weighting via simple sums is also 
expected to outperform completely random weighting in a large majority of cases 
(Hypothesis 4a). If sampling error in generating the consistent random weighting 
schemes is distributed evenly about the unit weights, unit weighting would likely be 
better than consistent random weighting about half the time, and worse the other half 
(Hypothesis 4b). Consistent application of a single set of random weights across all 
judgmental cases should yield more valid predictions of job performance compared to 
completely random weighting (Hypothesis 5). 
Given the importance of consistency as discussed previously, consistent random 
weighting is expected to outperform expert judgment in an overwhelming majority of 
cases (Hypothesis 6). If we also see that completely random weights mirror the predictive 
power of expert judges, then we have strong evidence that the judges are using 
information very inconsistently and that this inconsistency in combining information does 
not reflect utilising expert insight and strategies specific to individuals, contexts, or jobs 
that improve their judgments.  
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Method 
 
Sample 
Study 3 uses the three archival individual assessment validation datasets from 
Study 1. Missing data were handled using the multiple imputation procedure described in 
Study 1. Analyses were conducted using both listwise deletion and multiple imputation. 
Conclusions were the same for both methods of handling missing data. Because listwise 
deletion is the less preferable option and for the sake of brevity, only results obtained via 
multiple imputation will be presented.  
 
Analyses 
The analyses described in this section were conducted separately using each of the 
three validation datasets. To simulate the use of random weights applied consistently, a 
set of seven weights were randomly sampled from a uniform distribution that ranged 
from 0 to 0.5, inclusive. This same set of random weights was then used to linearly 
combine each candidate’s seven assessment dimension ratings into an overall assessment 
rating. These overall ratings were then correlated with the candidates’ supervisory ratings 
of job performance as a measure of the predictive validity of applying a set of random 
weights consistently. This process is iterated 10,000 times, generating a total of 10,000 
correlations as validity coefficients. Table 7 presents an example of a consistent random 
weighting scheme. 
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To simulate the use of completely random weights for each candidate, the 
dimension ratings for each candidate are linearly combined into an overall rating using a 
set of seven weights that were randomly sampled from a uniform distribution that ranges 
from 0 to 0.5, inclusive. A new set of seven random weights was generated to combine 
the dimension ratings of each candidate into overall assessment ratings. In this case, no 
two candidates were evaluated using the exact same weighting scheme (unless by 
coincidence). Again, these overall ratings were then correlated with the candidates’ 
supervisory ratings of job performance as a measure of the predictive validity of applying 
completely random weights. This process is iterated 10,000 times, generating a total of 
10,000 correlations as validity coefficients. An example of a completely random 
weighting scheme is presented in Table 7. 
To provide points of comparison with non-random methods, the predictive 
validities of overall ratings made using non-random methods – expert judgment, simple 
sums, and optimal weighting – were computed. First, the overall assessment ratings made 
using the assessors’ expert judgment were correlated with the supervisory ratings of job 
performance as a measure of the predictive validity of expert judgment. Second, assessor 
model weighted overall ratings were calculated by linearly weighting the dimension 
ratings by the assessor model specific to the dataset. Correlating this with the candidates’ 
job performance yielded the predictive validity of an assessor model weighted composite. 
Last, optimally weighted overall ratings were calculated by first obtaining the optimal 
weights by extracting the regression coefficients from an ordinary least squares multiple 
linear regression model using the candidates’ dimension ratings to predict their job 
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performance. Each candidates’ dimension ratings were then linearly combined using 
these optimal weights into an optimally weighted composite. Correlating this composite 
score with their job performance yielded the predictive validity of an optimally weighted 
composite. 
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Results 
 
Figure 8 displays results for analyses using the Company A data, Figure 9 
displays results for analyses using the Company B, Sample 1 data, and Figure 10 displays 
results for analyses using the Company B, Sample 2 data.  
Comparing the non-random methods in predicting supervisory ratings of job 
performance at Company A, overall ratings made using optimal weights (r = .25) were 
better predictors than those made using simple sums (r = .19), which in turn performed 
about the same as those made using clinical expert judgment (r = .17). In Company B, 
Sample 1, optimal weights (r = .40) were better than unit weights (r = .33), which were 
better than expert judgment (r = .16), and a similar pattern was found in Company B, 
Sample 2 where optimal weights (r = .30) were better than unit weights (r=.22), which 
were better than expert judgment (r= .13). 
 When the overall ratings computed using random methods were used to predict 
job performance at Company A, across 10,000 iterations, random weights applied 
consistently across candidates had a mean predictive validity of r = .18 (SD = .02), and 
ranged from r = .10 to .22. Random weights applied consistently outperformed expert 
judgments in 76.83% of the iterations, simple sums in 39.40% of the iterations, and never 
outperformed optimal weights. Completely random weighting across candidates had a 
mean validity of r = .09 (SD = .02), and ranged from r = -.01 to .19. Completely random 
weights never outperformed expert judgment, simple sums, or optimal weights. 69.85% 
of the iterations for completely random weights were outperformed by all of the iterations 
for random weights applied consistently. 
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At Company B, Sample 1 across 10,000 iterations, random weights applied 
consistently across candidates had a mean validity of r = .34 (SD = .03), and ranged from 
r = .20 to .40. Random weights applied consistently outperformed expert judgments in 
100% of the iterations, simple sums in 32.96% of the iterations, and never outperformed 
optimal weights. Completely random weighting across candidates had a mean validity of 
r = .16 (SD = .03), and ranged from r = .05 to .27. Completely random weights 
outperformed expert judgments in 8.49% of the iterations, but never outperformed simple 
sums or optimal weights. 94.05% of the iterations for completely random weights were 
outperformed by all of the iterations for random weights applied consistently. 
At Company B, Sample 2 across 10,000 iterations, random weights applied 
consistently across candidates had a mean validity of r = .24 (SD = .02), and ranged from 
r = .15 to .29. Random weights applied consistently outperformed expert judgments in 
100% of the iterations, simple sums in 36.12% of the iterations, and never outperformed 
optimal weights. Completely random weighting across candidates had a mean validity of 
r = .12 (SD = .02), and ranged from r = .05 to .20. Completely random weights 
outperformed expert judgments in 22.22% of the iterations, but never outperformed 
simple sums or optimal weights. 96.69% of the iterations for completely random weights 
were outperformed by all of the iterations for random weights applied consistently. 
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Discussion 
 
Across the three samples, experts outperformed completely random weights 
100%, 91.5%, and 77.8% of the time in predicting subsequent job performance ratings in 
Company A, Company B, Sample 1, and Company B, Sample 2, respectively. In turn, 
random weights, consistently applied, outperformed experts 76.8%, 100%, and 100% of 
the time. These results indicate that experts do not make judgments completely randomly 
and are aware, to some extent, of what information is most valuable. However, their 
inconsistency in combining information does drastically damage their accuracy. This 
simulation study demonstrates that consistency in applying predictor weights is 
paramount to making accurate judgments.  
There are several points that are worth considering. The most important and 
striking is that mindless consistency is enough to result in more accuracy than expert 
judgment. On average, random weights applied consistently resulted in better predictions 
than the assessors’ own judgments, which parallels Dawes and Corrigan’s (1974) earlier 
study of random weighting. In the Company A analyses, consistent use of random 
weights dominated the experts in the majority of cases. In the analyses for both Samples 
1 and 2 at Company B, consistent use of random weights completely dominated the 
experts.  
At this point, it is unclear what determines the extent to which consistent random 
weights will dominate over expert judgment, but it may be in part a function of the 
strength of the predictor-criterion relationships: based on the predictive validity of the 
optimal weighting schemes, it is clear that these assessment dimensions are better at 
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predicting performance at Company B than at Company A. However, both Company B 
samples show 100% dominance of consistent random weights over expert judgment, but 
the optimal validity and the validity of expert judgment at Sample 2 are both lower than 
those at Sample 1. Another possibility is that dominance is dependent on the difference 
between the validities of expert judgment and optimal weighting as this difference is 
larger in both Company B samples compared to Company A. More research across a 
larger number of samples will be needed to decipher the mechanism underlying this 
dominance effect. 
Differences in the validity of expert judgment across the three samples were fairly 
small. However, the dominance of expert judgment over completely random weighting 
was not the same. At Company A, expert judgment was completely better than 
completely random weights, but at both Company B samples, expert judgment was not 
always better than completely random. Possible explanations include that the assessors at 
Company A were simply more consistent or incorporating mechanical approaches to their 
judgment, or there may be differences in the variability of candidate characteristics 
between each sample that may impact how well a completely random weighting scheme 
would perform. Further research will be needed to determine organizational and 
individual differences that may influence the differences in validity between clinical 
expert judgment and mechanical methods of judgment. Nevertheless, it is troubling that 
expert assessors are not always better than completely random as it suggests that they do 
not necessarily understand what they are doing when combining information and 
evaluating candidates. 
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Ultimately, the finding that even random weights perform well when applied 
consistently suggests that consistency in applying predictor weights are more important 
than the weights themselves. Linear models are quite robust, and as long as the signs on 
the weights do not change (as is the case in the present study where all weights were 
positive), changes in weights are not expected to drastically impact their predictive power 
(Dawes, 1979). As Waller (2008) demonstrated with fungible weights, it is possible to 
derive an infinite number of alternate regression weighting schemes that yield a 
predictive validity almost as good as that of optimal weights (in multiple regression with 
three or more predictors). That being said, even though it is possible to generate a set of 
random weights that will perform very well when applied consistently, it can be difficult 
or impossible to tell how well that set of random weights will perform until the validation 
is conducted. In this simulation study, both optimal and unit weights via simple sums 
tend to perform better than random weights applied consistently. Practically speaking, if 
optimal weights are not known or cannot be approximated, it would be better to simply 
add up predictor scores instead of using an ill-defined weighting scheme.  
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General Discussion 
  
Organisations that implement individual assessments have largely relied on expert 
judgment to evaluate the suitability of candidates for jobs and to predict candidates’ 
future job performance. This is a practice that has been advocated by prominent members 
of our field such a Silzer and Jeanneret (2011), who made weakly supported claims that 
expert judges can integrate information in superhuman ways. What has been 
demonstrated in this study is that in comparison to the levels of predictive validity that 
could theoretically have been achieved, the expert assessors in fact typically do quite 
poorly when evaluating assessment candidates.  
Study 1 was a Lens Model decomposition of expert judgment in individual 
assessments. It found that the validity of expert judgment was, on average, far from 
optimal and that experts used suboptimal judgment policies and used them inconsistently. 
If the experts had basically used their own policy consistently, they would have done 
better than whatever it was that they did when making their original judgments. Study 2 
examined whether the expert assessors were able to validly tailor their judgmental 
policies to specific organisations to maximise prediction at specific organisations. The 
opposite was found where judgment policies local and non-local to organisations all 
performed about the same no matter which organisation they were utilised. Additionally, 
simply adding up predictor scores performed just as well. Study 3 determined that 
judgmental consistency was paramount to maximising predictive validity by simulating 
random weighting schemes. Even mindless consistency by applying a random weighting 
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policy consistently across all candidates was enough to outperform the experts. Taken 
together, the three studies presented in this dissertation along with the broader judgment 
and decision making literature demonstrate that claims about the ability of expert judges 
to handle complex information and to make complex judgments are not grounded in 
reality. Over the long run, even if the expert can beat the mechanical model from time to 
time, opportunities for human error will be a lot more common than opportunities for 
expertise to be truly influential. As a result, the mechanical model will come out ahead. 
 
Making an Expert 
It could be argued that the assessors present in the samples studied are not truly 
experts, and this boils down to an issue of how expertise is determined. Because the 
judgmental accuracy of the assessors cannot be determined until after the validation study 
has been conducted, it is the assumption of expertise that is of critical concern, which is 
an assumption based on credentials, experience, and/or nomination by peers. This 
definition of expertise is similar to that used in the Naturalistic Decision Making 
paradigm for studying expert judgment (Klein, 2008; Klein et al., 1993). With this 
approach, expertise is assumed and it is assumed that the judgments and decisions of 
these assumed experts are “correct16.” As such, initial claims of expertise are not 
necessarily grounded in demonstrated judgmental ability, but are instead based on 
perceptive criteria such as credentials, experience, and nomination by peers.  
                                                 
16 Especially in high-stakes, time-sensitive decision situations (e.g., military combat action, firefighting), 
“correct” does not necessarily mean optimal but rather something that at least adequately solves the 
problem at hand while minimising negative consequences as much as possible. 
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Taking this approach of expertise by assumption, it is possible that the expert 
assessors present in the studied samples were hired based on their perceived ability to 
make accurate judgments, but may not truly have been able to do so when put into actual 
practice. If a distinction must be made between assumed and true expertise, it then 
becomes more troubling that a prominent (but anonymous) management consulting firm 
offering services for high-stakes employment testing did not assign assessors who were 
truly experts in the first place. 
 
A Criterion Problem 
A possible reason why lower than average validities were observed in this 
dissertation may be that the supervisory ratings of job performance used as the criterion 
were deficient or otherwise inappropriate representations of the candidates’ actual job 
performance. Such a “criterion problem” in identifying an adequate or the best 
representation of job performance has long plagued the field of industrial/organisational 
psychology (Austin & Villanova, 1992). Nowadays, a better representation of job 
performance is available in Campbell’s (2012) eight-dimension model of job 
performance17, which happen to parallel the assessment dimensions featured in this 
dissertation (albeit not a one-to-one correspondence). In practice however, it is very 
likely that rating measures of job performance are deficient with regard to these 
dimensions, contaminated with information not related to job performance, or fraught 
                                                 
17 The dimensions are: 1) job-specific technical task proficiency, 2) non-job-specific technical task 
proficiency, 3) written and oral communication task proficiency, 4) demonstrating effort, 5) maintaining 
personal discipline, 6) facilitating peer and team performance, 7) supervision/leadership, and 8) 
management/administration. 
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with other sources of error (Campbell, 2012). To the extent that these supervisory ratings 
are poor measures of actual job performance, they would be more difficult to accurately 
predict if the goal is to predict actual job performance. It is worth noting that the ratings 
obtained here were for research rather than administrative purposes, which should 
improve their veracity.   
 The other side of the same criterion coin concerns what the expert assessors were 
actually trying to predict. Their official goal was to rate each candidate on person-job fit 
intended to eventually predict their performance once on the job. If they instead tried to 
predict other non-performance variables (e.g., likelihood of quitting the job), then their 
rating would be deficient with regard to job performance and contaminated with 
irrelevant information. Additionally, as observed in the relative weights analyses from 
Study 2, the assessors’ ideas about what is most important for predicting performance 
differs from those of the supervisor raters. Therefore, it is possible that the expert 
assessors are more competent than the present findings have led us to believe, but also 
that their competence lies in predicting something they were not originally set out to 
predict. Future studies should examine whether experts are better at predicting certain 
types of criteria, such as performance-related versus non-performance-related or 
objective versus subjective. 
 
Access to Additional Information 
 What all of the mechanical methods implemented in the analyses for this 
dissertation have in common is that they all combined the seven assessment dimensions 
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into an overall rating, albeit using different weighting schemes. Yet it is true that the 
expert assessors could have had more information about the candidates beyond scores on 
these seven assessment dimensions, such as their performance on individual assessment 
activities, test profiles, and biographical information obtained from sources such as 
résumés and personal interaction. This could be viewed as an advantage that a human 
judge has over a mechanical method. Despite the possibility that the experts had this 
information available to them, they still performed worse than any mechanical method. 
Prior research has shown that although people tend to become more confident about their 
judgments with more information available, they are not always more accurate (Tsai, 
Klayman, & Hastie, 2008). 
 If this use of additional information was actually the case, it may have ended up 
hindering the experts’ judgments rather than being a blessing. As seen via the imperfect 
value for cue sensitivity in Study 1 and the relative weights analyses in Study 2 showing 
that the weighting structure of the assessor models were discrepant from the structure of 
the optimal ecology models, the expert assessors did not combine information in a way 
that reflected what was optimal in reality. It is possible that this discrepancy may have 
been, at least in part, due to this outside information influencing what the experts ended 
up concluding to be the most important assessment dimensions for evaluating their 
candidates. For example, they may have perceived a handful of candidates to have 
extraordinary leadership ability, which would end up making the leadership dimension 
more salient. As a result, they may have emphasised leadership in their evaluations when 
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in reality leadership contributed little to performance once on the job. Further research 
will be needed to test this hypothesis. 
 
Data Limitations 
There are a couple features (or shortcomings) of the data used in this dissertation 
that limited the scope of the analyses that could be conducted. These come down to issues 
of luck and opportunity in obtaining datasets with desired characteristics or qualities18. 
The first issue concerns the level of analysis. Ideally, the most powerful analysis would 
have been to model each individual assessor and test the predictive accuracy of each 
assessor. However, the relatively small sample sizes in the validation datasets meant that 
the “models of man” could only be confidently derived at the level of each dataset to 
reflect the average model across multiple assessors. Therefore, models were derived for 
Company A, Company B, Sample 1, and Company B, Sample 2, but not for the 
individual assessors in each sample. This sample size limitation is fairly characteristic of 
research in this domain as many Lens Model studies are conducted at an aggregated level 
(Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).  
The second data issue concerns the timeliness of the data as they are at least a 
couple decades old at the time of this writing. It is possible that the state of expert 
judgment in individual assessments has improved over time, but the fact that the stubborn 
reliance on expert judgment is still a recent subject for discussion (e.g., Highhouse, 2008; 
                                                 
18 The data used in this dissertation has been a truly invaluable resource and has made a plethora of 
analyses possible. As a researcher and generally optimistic human being however, I would like to believe 
that we can always do better. 
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Kuncel & Highhouse, 2011) and that recent studies still find that people prefer subjective 
over mechanical methods of judgment (Diab et al., 2011; Eastwood et al., 2012) suggests 
that this problem still persists in the present day. Furthermore, time does not necessarily 
heal. In this dissertation for example, Company B, Sample 2 was a validation study 
conducted after the Company B, Sample 1 validation study, but validities were lower 
across the board for Sample 2 compared to Sample 1. More information not currently 
available in these datasets would be needed to determine whether there are factors other 
than time at play, but it does seem that past lessons have not been completely effective at 
informing future practices. These issues of subjective versus mechanical judgment have 
been discussed as early as Meehl (1954), so it is perhaps a bit disheartening to find that 
the basic points still need to be argued today in the face of overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating the general inefficacy of human or expert judgment, as well as evidence in 
support of the superiority of mechanical methods of judgment. 
 
Practical Recommendations 
 Even though there has been a large body of evidence for the superiority of 
mechanical methods of judgment over human judgment across a range of decision 
contexts, I have no intention of suggesting that human or expert judgment should be 
replaced by purely mechanical methods. There is enough resistance against it and 
preference towards expert judgment (Diab et al., 2011; Eastwood et al., 2012, Highhouse, 
2008; Kleinmuntz, 1990) that it would not be a realistic option. I believe that there is 
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enough face19 validity in expert judgment that makes it worth retaining. That said, if 
expert judgment is to be retained, it clearly needs to be improved. Fortunately, there are 
options for supporting expert judgment with mechanical methods.  
 “Model of man.” Evident from the imperfect values of cognitive control in Study 
1, along with the finding that mindless consistency is enough to outperform the expert 
assessors in Study 3, one of the main concerns that detriments the validity of expert 
judgment is the inconsistency with which the expert assessors apply their weighting 
schemes when evaluating multiple candidates. By modeling the assessors (i.e., subject 
side of the Lens Model), we can obtain the average judgment policy for an assessor or 
across multiple assessors, and then apply this assessor model consistently across all cases 
as was done in Studies 1 and 2. Studies 2 and 3 also showed that while it is best to have 
optimal weights, the actual weights used in a model really does not matter as much as the 
fact that the weights are being applied consistently. As mentioned previously, linear 
models are robust to changes in the weights as long as they do not flip signs (Dawes, 
1979). By modeling the assessors and then applying their model to evaluate candidates, 
expert judgment is retained in terms of specifying the model, and it ensures the 
consistency with which the expert’s policy is applied. This procedure was tested as early 
as Goldberg (1970), and works just as well today. 
 Just “man.” Since the optimality of the weighting scheme matters less than the 
consistency with which it is applied, the simpler option would be to just ask an expert 
assessor to define weighting scheme and then apply that expert-defined scheme 
                                                 
19 Quite literally, an expert judge has a face whereas a mechanical model does not. 
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mechanically. To wash out individual error in defining a set of weights, it would be even 
better to take the average across a group of expert-defined weighting schemes. 
Functionally, this can be applied exactly the same as the “model of man” method, except 
that it skips the modeling step. This is particularly beneficial when no judgment 
information has yet been collected, preventing the “model of man” from being derived. 
 Anchoring. If expert input is desired in the actual judgmental data combination 
process and not simply the initial definition of weights, judgmental consistency could be 
improved via anchoring. When people are provided anchor values, they typically do not 
adjust their judgmental process too far from the anchor value (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the present case, the “model of man” dimension weights 
can be provided as an anchor weighting scheme, or the expert assessor could also be 
asked to define their own weighting scheme. By having an explicit set of anchor 
dimension weights defined and available to the assessor, it may reduce the assessors’ 
volatility in weighting the assessment dimensions across multiple candidates. It may also 
be effective to set limits on adjustments away from the anchors or require justification for 
adjusting away from the anchors. 
 Clinical and mechanical synthesis. Clinical and mechanical synthesis were 
described by Sawyer (1966). In clinical synthesis, the assessor is given the mechanical 
composite rating, and is then free to make the final prediction by combining the 
mechanical composite with the original data. In mechanical synthesis, the assessor 
combines the dimension information using their own judgmental policy, after which the 
expert’s judgment is mechanically combined with the original data to obtain a final 
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overall judgment. Sawyer (1966) showed that when the assessor has final say in clinical 
synthesis, validity was better than if the evaluation was purely left up to the assessor, but 
was worse than the purely mechanical composite. With mechanical synthesis, including 
the judge’s clinical prediction in the final prediction still preserves predictive accuracy 
relative to a purely mechanical composite that excludes the clinical prediction. Both 
clinical and mechanical synthesis would be expected to result in better prediction than the 
assessor alone, but deciding between the two would be a trade-off between the amount of 
control given to the assessor and the level of accuracy that could be achieved. 
 Limit expert judgment. If the goal is to select the best candidate or a few top 
candidates from a larger candidate pool (i.e., if the selection ratio is low), candidates can 
be pre-screened using mechanical methods of judgment, after which the assessor can 
select among the top candidates (Kuncel, 2008). This limits the use of expert judgment to 
a set of candidates with similar predicted performance scores, and they are likely to be 
fairly invariant in terms of their actual job performance. Even if the expert does not select 
the optimal choice, the loss in performance (or other desired outcomes) by selecting a 
candidate a few ranks lower is likely to be negligible. 
 Aggregate expert judgment. An additional procedure that could be carried out 
with any of the aforementioned procedures is to aggregate the judgments of multiple 
assessors. The goal here is to basically wash out any individual errors in judgment and 
promote any judgmental policies that are in agreement, which should result in more 
consistent judgments across cases.  
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 There are two ways of approaching the aggregation of expert judgment. One way 
is to have the expert assessors work in a group to come up with an overall group 
judgment. Such group decision making has been shown to outperform the individuals 
(e.g., Sniezek & Henry, 1989), but the process gains from group decision making may be 
offset by process losses (e.g., groupthink, social loafing) that introduce new forms of 
error (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). The other way of aggregating expert judgment is to simply 
have the expert assessors each make their judgments individually, and then take the 
average of their individual judgments. Here, process losses from active group decision 
making are avoided at the expense of missing out on possible gains above minimising 
individual error. With this method, it is also possible to differentially weight the 
contributions of each individual assessor if doing so could be reasonably expected to 
improve predictive accuracy. For example, the judgments of more experienced assessors 
or assessors who have demonstrated high accuracy in the past could be weighed more 
heavily than those less experienced or those with a poorer track record. 
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Conclusion 
  
Even if we have the good fortune of possessing a set of predictors that perfectly 
relates to the criterion, their predictive power is ultimately dependent on how that 
predictor information is used. Validity will be negatively impacted if the data 
combination method introduces error instead of maximising the predictive power of those 
predictors. When using individual assessments to evaluate candidates for jobs, the 
longstanding reliance on expert judgment has been a significant hindrance to ensuring the 
validity of these assessments.  
 The bad news is that expert assessors have frequently been found to be both 
suboptimal and inconsistent in their use of predictor weighting schemes to combine 
assessment dimension information, resulting in lower levels of validity than what could 
have theoretically been achieved. Expertise is in no way a guarantee of validity, and 
attempts to exercise expert insight often ends up introducing more error than validity. The 
good news is that there are methods that can potentially reduce human error and improve 
the consistency of expert judgment while still retaining the use of expert judgment so as 
to avoid negative reactions toward the pure use of mechanical methods. Further research 
into these methods and continual development of new methods of improving human 
judgment will not only improve our ability to maximise the predictive and face validity of 
our assessments, but can also be more broadly applied to improving judgment and 
decision making processes, no matter the context.  
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Table 1 
Summary of Studies 
Study 1: A Lens Model Decomposition of Individual Assessments 
Purpose To break down expert judgment in individual assessments into its 
component processes, and to evaluate their contributions (or 
hindrances) toward the use of individual assessments to predict job 
performance in comparison to mechanical data combination methods. 
Sample Archival individual assessment validation datasets: 
- Expert-judged overall assessment ratings for each candidate based 
on ratings on seven assessment dimensions (adjustment, 
administration, communication, interpersonal, judgment, 
leadership, and motivation), which were based on each candidate’s 
performance on a mix of in-basket, interviews, leaderless group 
discussions, personality tests, and cognitive ability tests 
- Supervisory ratings of job performance 
 
1) Company A (financial services provider) 
- 231 candidates 
- 26 assessors 
- Conducted between 1994 and 1997 
2) Company B (food retailer), Sample 1 
- 195 candidates 
- 23 assessors 
- Conducted between 1980 and 1988 
3) Company B, Sample 2 
- 421 candidates 
- 30 assessors 
- Conducted between 1989 and 1999 
Analyses - Lens Model parameters calculated as described in Table 2 
- Regression modeling via ordinary least squares multiple regression 
- Analyses conducted at the level of each dataset, then additionally 
aggregated via sample-size weighting 
Hypotheses - Mechanical data combinations will outperform clinical 
combinations (expert judgment) in predicting job performance 
- Bootstrapped “model of man” will outperform expert judgment 
- Low unmodeled knowledge: observed criterion values and subject 
judgments are sufficiently modelled by multiple linear regression  
- Moderate to high cue sensitivity: judges use cue weights that are 
not perfectly inconsistent with ecological weights in either or both 
magnitude and rank order 
- Moderate to high cognitive control: judges are not perfectly 
consistent in their application of a single cue weighting policy 
across judgments 
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Table 1 
Summary of Studies - continued 
Study 2: Local versus Non-Local Models of Expert Judgment 
Purpose To test the validity of expert insight by evaluating whether models of 
expert assessors derived from a specific organisation are better at 
predicting job performance at the same organisation compared to 
models of expert assessors derived from a different organisation. 
Sample Archival individual assessment validation datasets: 
- Same as Study 1 
 
Archival general individual assessment dataset: 
- Does not contain job performance validation information 
- 16,143 candidates 
- 176 assessors 
- 683 organisations 
- Conducted between 1971 and 2000 
Analyses - “Model of man” derived for each dataset (expert-judged overall 
assessment ratings regressed on dimension ratings) 
- Each model applied to each validation dataset (all possible 
combinations) to combine assessment dimensions ratings into 
“model of man” overall assessment ratings 
- Other mechanical composites of dimension ratings obtained via: 
- Unit weighting via simple sums (sum of all dimensions) 
- Optimal regression weighting 
- Predictive validity of these methods of obtaining the overall 
assessment ratings quantified by correlating them with supervisory 
ratings of job performance 
Hypotheses - Mechanical methods will outperform expert judgment 
- Overall ratings made via optimal regression weighting will 
perform the best 
- If expert insight is valid: 
- The model local to one specific organisational sample should 
outperform the model from a different organisational sample or 
from a model not specific to any one organisation (i.e., the 
general model) 
- If expert insight is not valid: 
- The model local to one specific organisational sample would 
not outperform the model from a different organisational 
sample or from a model not specific to any one organisation 
(i.e., the general model) 
- Non-local model may outperform the local model by chance 
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Table 1 
Summary of Studies - continued 
Study 3: Comparing Random Weighting Schemes with Expert Judgments 
Purpose To determine the extent to which consistency in applying a single 
predictor weighting scheme contributes to predictive validity by testing 
random weighting methods to isolate consistent weighting from 
accurate weighting. 
Sample Archival individual assessment validation datasets: 
- Same as Study 1 
Analyses Monte Carlo simulation: 
1) Random weights applied consistently 
- Seven weights randomly sampled from a uniform distribution 
ranging from 0 to 0.5, inclusive 
- This same set of weights used to linearly combine each 
candidate’s dimension ratings into an overall assessment rating 
2) Random weights applied randomly 
- Seven weights randomly sampled from a uniform distribution 
ranging from 0 to 0.5, inclusive 
- A new set of random weights generated to linearly combine 
each candidate’s dimension ratings into an overall rating 
- Predictive validity of each method quantified by correlating the 
overall assessment ratings with supervisory ratings of job 
performance 
- 10,000 iterations for each method, for a total of 10,000 validity 
coefficients each 
 
- Compared to non-random methods of data combination: 
- Expert judgment 
- Simple sums 
- Optimal regression weighting 
Hypotheses - Mechanical methods will outperform expert judgment 
- Optimal regression weighting will perform the best on average 
- Non-random methods will outperform random methods on average 
- Consistent random weights will outperform completely random 
weights on average 
- Consistent random weights will outperform expert judgment in an 
overwhelming majority of iterations 
- If judges are not consistent with using a single weighting policy 
and if this inconsistency does not reflect valid expert insight, 
completely random weights could potentially match or outperform 
expert judgment 
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Table 3 
Ecology Models 
Dataset Dimension b SE R2 
Company A Motivation .10 .14 .06 
 Judgment .05 .10  
 Administrative .19 .10  
 Communication -.32 .19  
 Interpersonal .16 .20  
 Leadership .14 .18  
 Adjustment .07 .19  
     
Company B, Motivation .30 .13 .17 
Sample 1 Judgment .23 .08  
 Administrative .21 .11  
 Communication -.01 .13  
 Interpersonal -.02 .11  
 Leadership .04 .11  
 Adjustment .06 .12  
     
Company B, Motivation .10 .09 .09 
Sample 2 Judgment -.02 .06  
 Administrative .43 .11  
 Communication -.04 .12  
 Interpersonal .13 .09  
 Leadership .02 .09  
 Adjustment .00 .11  
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Table 4 
Subject Models 
Dataset Dimension b SE R2 
Company A Motivation .01 .05 .69 
 Judgment .21 .03  
 Administrative .04 .03  
 Communication .10 .06  
 Interpersonal .20 .06  
 Leadership .34 .06  
 Adjustment .13 .06  
     
Company B, Motivation .27 .11 .54 
Sample 1 Judgment .26 .09  
 Administrative .15 .12  
 Communication .08 .11  
 Interpersonal .21 .10  
 Leadership .10 .09  
 Adjustment .29 .11  
     
Company B, Motivation .04 .07 .57 
Sample 2 Judgment .28 .03  
 Administrative -.05 .07  
 Communication .05 .08  
 Interpersonal .21 .05  
 Leadership .27 .05  
 Adjustment .14 .06  
     
General Motivation .09 .01 .69 
Assessment Judgment .22 .01  
Dataset Administrative .13 .01  
 Communication .11 .01  
 Interpersonal .20 .01  
 Leadership .24 .01  
 Adjustment .21 .01  
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Table 7 
Example Consistent and Completely Random Weighting Schemes 
Candidate 
Consistent Random Weights Completely Random Weights 
W1 W2 … W7 W1 W2 … W7 
1 .02 .36 
… 
.19 .35 .45 
… 
.12 
2 .02 .36 .19 .15 .11 .28 
3 .02 .36 .19 .43 .06 .33 
4 .02 .36 .19 .04 .41 .31 
5 .02 .36 .19 .22 .17 .09 
 
  
  
105 
 
F
ig
u
re
 1
. 
T
h
e 
L
en
s 
M
o
d
el
. 
 
 N
o
te
. 
A
d
ap
te
d
 w
it
h
 p
er
m
is
si
o
n
 f
ro
m
 K
u
n
ce
l 
(p
er
so
n
al
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
).
 
  
106 
 
F
ig
u
re
 2
. 
E
x
am
p
le
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
p
la
n
 f
o
r 
S
tu
d
y
 2
 f
o
r 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
. 
T
h
e 
sa
m
e 
an
al
y
si
s 
is
 c
o
n
d
u
ct
ed
 f
o
r 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 1
, 
an
d
 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 2
, 
ex
ce
p
t 
th
e 
lo
ca
l 
an
d
 n
o
n
-l
o
ca
l 
as
se
ss
o
r 
m
o
d
el
s 
w
il
l 
b
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
 t
o
 e
ac
h
 s
o
u
rc
e 
d
at
as
et
. 
  
107 
 
F
ig
u
re
 3
. 
R
el
at
iv
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 f
o
r 
th
e 
ec
o
lo
g
y
 m
o
d
el
s.
 
 
 
  
108 
 
F
ig
u
re
 4
. 
R
el
at
iv
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 f
o
r 
th
e 
su
b
je
ct
 m
o
d
el
s.
 
  
 
  
109 
 
F
ig
u
re
 5
. 
V
al
id
it
ie
s 
o
f 
o
v
er
al
l 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
d
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
fo
r 
p
re
d
ic
ti
n
g
 s
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
 r
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
jo
b
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
t 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
. 
 
 
  
110 
 
F
ig
u
re
 6
. 
V
al
id
it
ie
s 
o
f 
o
v
er
al
l 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
d
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
fo
r 
p
re
d
ic
ti
n
g
 s
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
 r
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
jo
b
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
t 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 1
. 
 
  
111 
 
F
ig
u
re
 7
. 
V
al
id
it
ie
s 
o
f 
o
v
er
al
l 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
d
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
fo
r 
p
re
d
ic
ti
n
g
 s
u
p
er
v
is
o
ry
 r
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
jo
b
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
t 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 2
. 
 
  
112 
 
F
ig
u
re
 8
. 
D
en
si
ty
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
v
al
id
it
ie
s 
(1
0
,0
0
0
 i
te
ra
ti
o
n
s 
ea
ch
) 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
 o
f 
p
re
d
ic
to
r 
sc
o
re
s 
co
m
b
in
ed
 u
si
n
g
 r
an
d
o
m
 
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 a
p
p
li
ed
 c
o
n
si
st
en
tl
y
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll
 c
an
d
id
at
es
 (
to
p
 p
lo
t)
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
le
te
ly
 r
an
d
o
m
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 (
b
o
tt
o
m
 p
lo
t)
 g
en
er
at
ed
 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 c
an
d
id
at
e.
 V
er
ti
ca
l 
li
n
es
 a
re
 v
al
id
it
ie
s 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
 o
f 
n
o
n
-r
an
d
o
m
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
o
f 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
: 
ex
p
er
t 
ju
d
g
m
en
t 
(s
o
li
d
 
li
n
e)
, 
u
n
it
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 v
ia
 s
im
p
le
 s
u
m
s 
(d
as
h
ed
 l
in
e)
, 
an
d
 o
p
ti
m
al
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 (
d
o
tt
ed
 l
in
e)
. 
  
113 
 
F
ig
u
re
 9
. 
D
en
si
ty
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
v
al
id
it
ie
s 
(1
0
,0
0
0
 i
te
ra
ti
o
n
s 
ea
ch
) 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 1
 o
f 
p
re
d
ic
to
r 
sc
o
re
s 
co
m
b
in
ed
 u
si
n
g
 
ra
n
d
o
m
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 a
p
p
li
ed
 c
o
n
si
st
en
tl
y
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll
 c
an
d
id
at
es
 (
to
p
 p
lo
t)
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
le
te
ly
 r
an
d
o
m
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 (
b
o
tt
o
m
 p
lo
t)
 
g
en
er
at
ed
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
an
d
id
at
e.
 V
er
ti
ca
l 
li
n
es
 a
re
 v
al
id
it
ie
s 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
 o
f 
n
o
n
-r
an
d
o
m
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
o
f 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
: 
ex
p
er
t 
ju
d
g
m
en
t 
(s
o
li
d
 l
in
e)
, 
u
n
it
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 v
ia
 s
im
p
le
 s
u
m
s 
(d
as
h
ed
 l
in
e)
, 
an
d
 o
p
ti
m
al
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 (
d
o
tt
ed
 l
in
e)
. 
 
  
114 
 
F
ig
u
re
 1
0
. 
D
en
si
ty
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
v
al
id
it
ie
s 
(1
0
,0
0
0
 i
te
ra
ti
o
n
s 
ea
ch
) 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 B
, 
S
am
p
le
 2
 o
f 
p
re
d
ic
to
r 
sc
o
re
s 
co
m
b
in
ed
 u
si
n
g
 
ra
n
d
o
m
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 a
p
p
li
ed
 c
o
n
si
st
en
tl
y
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll
 c
an
d
id
at
es
 (
to
p
 p
lo
t)
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
le
te
ly
 r
an
d
o
m
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
w
ei
g
h
ts
 (
b
o
tt
o
m
 p
lo
t)
 
g
en
er
at
ed
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
an
d
id
at
e.
 V
er
ti
ca
l 
li
n
es
 a
re
 v
al
id
it
ie
s 
at
 C
o
m
p
an
y
 A
 o
f 
n
o
n
-r
an
d
o
m
 m
et
h
o
d
s 
o
f 
d
at
a 
co
m
b
in
at
io
n
: 
ex
p
er
t 
ju
d
g
m
en
t 
(s
o
li
d
 l
in
e)
, 
u
n
it
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 v
ia
 s
im
p
le
 s
u
m
s 
(d
as
h
ed
 l
in
e)
, 
an
d
 o
p
ti
m
al
 w
ei
g
h
ti
n
g
 (
d
o
tt
ed
 l
in
e)
. 
